We investigate how borrowers’ corporate governance influences bank loan contracting terms in emerging markets and how this relation varies across countries with different country-level governance. We find that borrowers with stronger corporate governance obtain favorable contracting terms with respect to loan amount, maturity, collateral requirements, and spread. Firm-level and country-level co...

External regulation is an important mechanism to improve corporate behavior in emerging markets. China's insurance governance regulation, which began to supervise and guide insurance corporate governance behavior in 2006, has experienced a complex process of reform. This study tested our hypotheses with a sample of 85 firms during 2010-2011, which was obtained by providing a questionnaire to al...

Corporate governance is a complex issue, the focal point of which is the exercise of power. The power has limits, however, imposed by both legislation and contracts. Also, even if the overarching power belongs to the shareholders, residual power cannot be exercised to the detriment of the rights of the other stakeholders. Because the governance system and resulting structures have a major influ...

In this paper, we examine the universality of “good” corporate governance practices as exemplified by the Anglo-American governance paradigm. Using a new database from Governance Metrics International featuring highly granular measures of corporate governance practices across a large number of countries for the period 2006-2011, we first find that the national cultural dimension of individualis...

The aim of this paper is to discuss the effect of corporate governance mechanisms on controlling CEOs’ emotions and some behavioral biases. Departing from a sample of 40 public traded Tunisian firms, we test the impact of the board of directors on managing CEO’s irrationalities. Our results highlight strong evidence on the role of the board characteristics, especially the board independence, a ...

This paper investigates the variation in contagion effect of corporate scandals on peers firms with different corporate governance quality. We find that better corporate governance reduces investors’ uncertainty about a firm’s fundamental value and alleviates the contagion effect of scandals. Specifically, the empirical results show that external governance, ownership structure and external aud...

The fallout of the Enron debacle spurred legislative and regulatory activity aimed at strengthening corporate governance and preventing another corporate implosion. Confronting shattered investor confidence, Congress responded to these corporate governance fiascos by enacting the now infamous Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), meanwhile, called on the self...

This article has two related tasks. First, we review the articles published in this Special Issue on Corporate Control, Mergers, and Acquisitions. These articles provide new evidence on several aspects of corporate control and governance including the value and performance effects of various ownership groups, the impact of internal governance structures, the effects of regulatory changes on spe...

Recent research studying the link between law and finance has concentrated on country-level investor protection measures and focused on differences in legal systems across countries and legal families. We use recent data on firm-level corporate governance rankings across 14 emerging markets and find that there is wide variation in firm-level governance across countries in our sample and that th...

Established firms often face significant obstacles to innovation. As a solution, it has been suggested to form corporate ventures. Based on a sample of corporate and independent ventures in German manufacturing, we show that corporate ventures are more innovative than the control group of independent ventures. In particular, corporate ventures are more successful at developing radical innovatio...