An infinite-horizon, stochastic model of entry and exit with sunk costs and imperfect competition is constructed. A subgame perfect Nash equilibrium for the general dynamic stochastic game is shown to exist as a limit of finite-horizon equilibria. This equilibrium has a relatively simple structure characterized by two numbers per finite history. Under very general conditions, it tends to exhibi...

We study a dynamic investment game with two-dimensional signals, where each firm observes its continuously distributed idiosyncratic cost of investment and a discrete signal correlated with common investment returns. We demonstrate that the one-step property holds and provide an equilibrium existence/characterization result. “Reversals” are possible, where a large number of firms investing in a...

A learning process is belief affirming if the difference between a player's expected payoff in the next period, and the average of his or her past payoffs converges to zero. We show that every smooth discrete fictitious play and every continuous fictitious play is belief affirming. We also provide conditions under which general averaging processes are belief affirming. Journal of Economic Liter...

A sufficient condition for the discounted Folk Theorem is that for every individually rational payoff vector u, there exists another individually rational payoff vector v such that v < u. We present an example of a full dimensional game where this property fails to be satisfied. Furthermore, we present a simple and direct proof that full dimensionality implies a weaker, but still sufficient pro...

We study a repeated game with asymmetric information about a dynamic state of nature. In the course of the game, the better informed player can communicate some or all of his information to the other. Our model covers costly and/or bounded communication. We characterize the set of equilibrium payoffs, and contrast these with the communication equilibrium payoffs, which by definition entail no c...

This paper formalizes an empirically implementable framework for the definition of local antitrust markets in retail markets. This framework rests on a demand model that captures the trade-off between distance and pecuniary cost across alternative shopping destinations within local markets. The paper develops, and presents estimation results for, an empirical demand model at the store level for...

This paper formalizes an empirically implementable framework for the definition of local antitrust markets in retail markets. This framework rests on a demand model that captures the trade-off between distance and pecuniary cost across alternative shopping destinations within local markets. The paper develops, and presents estimation results for, an empirical demand model at the store level for...

This paper analyze Nash’s equilibrium (maximum utilility MU) and its relation with the order state (minimum entropy ME). I introduce the concept of minimum entropy as a paradigm of both Nash-Hayek’s equilibrium. The ME concept is related to Quantum Games. One question arises after completing this exercise: What do the Quantum Mechanics postulates indicate about Game Theory and Economics? Journa...

Any absolutely continuous, piecewise smooth, symmetric two-player game can be extended to define a population game in which each player interacts with a large representative subset of the entire population. Assuming that players respond to the payoff gradient over a continuous action space, we obtain nonlinear integro-partial differential equations that are numerically tractable and sometimes a...

We consider two Bayesian agents who learn from exogenously provided private signals, as well as the actions of the other. Our main finding is that increased interaction between the agents can lower the speed of learning: when both agents observe each other, learning is significantly slower than it is when one only observes the other. This slowdown is driven by a process in which a consensus on ...