For the case of smooth concave exchange economies, we provide a characterization of the inner core as the set of feasible allocations such that no coalition can improve on it, even if coalitions are allowed to use some random plans. For the case of compactly generated games, we discuss Myerson’s definition of the inner core, and we characterize it using lexicographic utility weight systems.  2...

We present a taxonomy of myopic stability concepts for hedonic games in terms of deviations, and discuss the status of the existence problems of stable coalition structures. In particular, we show that contractual strictly core stable coalition structures always exist, and provide su¢ cient conditions for the existence of contractually Nash stable and weak individually stable coalition structur...

We compare bargaining solutions in terms of the relevance of alternatives. We show that most well-known bargaining solutions do not use all the alternatives, but there are numerous bargaining solutions that do. We introduce a new class of bargaining solutions called ``average alternative solutions'', characterize them, and show that the Nash solution and the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution are limit...

Inventory management studies how a single firm can minimize the average cost per time unit of its inventory. In this paper we extend this analysis to situations where a collective of firms minimizes its joint inventory cost by means of cooperation. Depending on the information revealed by the individual firms, we analyze related cooperative TU games and focus on proportional division mechanisms...

It is known that on some social choice and economic domains, a social choice function is coalition strategy-proof if and only if it is Maskin monotonic (e.g. Muller and Satterthwaite, 1977). This paper studies the foundation of those results. I provide a set of conditions which is sufficient for the equivalence between coalition strategy-proofness and Maskin monotonicity. This generalizes some ...

We study solutions that choose lotteries for profiles of preferences defined over sure alternatives. We define Nash equilibria based on “stochastic dominance” comparisons and study the implementability of solutions in such equilibria. We show that a Maskin-style invariance condition is necessary and sufficient for implementability. Our results apply to an abstract Arrovian environment as well a...

We establish a general n-player link between non-cooperative bargaining and the Nash solution. Non-cooperative bargaining is captured in a reduced form through the von Neumann-Morgenstern (1944) stability concept. A stable set always exists. Moreover, if the utility set has a smooth surface, then any stable set converges to the Nash bargaining solution. Finally, the equivalence of stationary eq...

We characterize the position value for arbitrary communication situations. The two properties involved in the characterization are component efficiency, which is standard, and balanced total threats, which is in the same spirit as balanced contributions. Since the Myerson value can be characterized by component efficiency and balanced contributions a comparison between the two allocation rules ...

Three solution concepts for cooperative games with random payoffs are introduced. These are the marginal value, the dividend value and the selector value. Inspiration for their definitions comes from several equivalent formulations of the Shapley value for cooperative TU games. An example shows that these solutionscan all be different for cooperative games with random payoffs. Properties are st...

We introduce and characterize a component efficient value for TU games with a cooperation structure which in contrast to the Myerson (1977, Math. Operations Res. 2: 225—229) value accounts for outside options. It is based on the idea that the distribution of the worth within a component should be consistent with some connected graph which reflects the outside options of the component’s players....