In this paper we discuss the integration of different GIR systems by means of a fuzzy Borda method for result fusion. Two of the systems, the one by the Universidad Politécnica de Valencia and the one of the Universidad of Jaén participated to the GeoCLEF task under the name TextMess. The proposed result fusion method takes as input the document lists returned by the different systems and retur...

Indicators system of China’s computer manufacturing enterprises of listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen can be established to reflect the efficiency of production, which accord to the number of employees, fixed assets and other economic data. Integrated data envelopment analysis (DEA) models are used, combining with evaluation and statistical tests of Synthetic Average method, Borda method...

Preliminaries • A social decision scheme (SDS) is a function that maps a preference profile to a lottery over the alternatives. Formally, an SDS is a function f : RFN → ∆(A). • An SDS is majoritarian if it only depends on the (unweighted) 
 majority comparisons between alternatives. • We compare lotteries using stochastic dominance (SD). A lottery p is preferred to another lottery q if the expe...

The pairwise lottery system is amultiple round voting procedure which chooses by lot a winner from a pair of alternatives to advance to the next round where in each round the odds of selection are based on each alternative’s majority rule votes. We develop a framework for determining the asymptotic relative likelihood of the lottery selecting in the final round the Borda winner, Condorcet winne...

I consider an extension of the Borda count to case when individuals can have weak preferences, and show that it satisfies several normatively appealing axioms. The first axiom is preferences Modified Independence Irrelevant Alternatives in Maskin (2020a). second a new which call Up–Down Symmetry. remaining axioms are more standard. • allows for preferences. this One Alternatives. Another called

We introduce the (j, k)-Kemeny rule – a generalization that aggregates weak orders. Special cases include approval voting, the mean rule and Borda mean rule, as well as the Borda count and plurality voting. Why, then, is the winner problem computationally simple for each of these other rules, but NP -hard for Kemeny? We show that winner intractability for the (j, k)-Kemeny rule first appears at...

We say that a preference profile exhibits pairwise consensus around some fixed relation, if whenever relation is closer to it than another one, the Kemeny distance of former not greater its latter. show then this coincides with binary induced by Borda count. also no other scoring rule always selects top ranked alternative which there when such exists.

General conclusions relating pairwise tallies with positional (e.g., plurality, antiplurality (“vote-for-two”)) election outcomes were previously known only for the Borda Count. While it has been known since the eighteenth century that the Borda and Condorcet winners need not agree, it had not been known, for instance, in which settings the Condorcet and plurality winners can disagree, or must ...