We study the role of information about multiplier in a finitely repeated investment game. A high increases reputational incentives trustee, leading to more repayments. Our perfect Bayesian equilibrium analysis shows that if trustee is privately informed multiplier, both expected frequency investments and repayments as well payoffs players are higher compared situation where public knowledge. te...

This work studies the information content of trades in world’s largest over-the-counter (OTC) market, foreign exchange (FX) market. It analyzes a novel, comprehensive order flow data set, distinguishing among different groups market participants and covering large cross-section currency pairs. We find compelling evidence heterogeneous superior across agents, time, pairs, consistent with asymmet...

We study how asymmetric information affects the set of rationalizable solutions in a linear setup where the outcome is determined by forecasts about this same outcome. The unique rational expectations equilibrium is also the unique rationalizable solution when the sensitivity of the outcome to agents’ forecasts is less than one, provided that this sensitivity is common knowledge. Relaxing this ...

Abstract This article aims to provide theoretical model for analyzing challenge of asymmetric information in the third sector of economy (which is the most important challenge, preventing the growth and development of third sector), using the theoretical foundation of contract theory and incentive theory with regard to the special characteristics of third sector derived by its special structur...