This article studies the use of different distribution channels as an instrument of price discrimination in credence goods markets. In credence goods markets, where consumers do not know which quality of the good or service they need, price discrimination proceeds along the dimension of quality of advice offered. High quality advice and appropriate treatment is provided to the most profitable m...

Analysis of the welfare effect of advertising depends critically upon the effect of advertising on market prices. In many circumstances, advertising that leads to higher (lower) market prices is overproduced (underproduced) from society s perspective. This paper demonstrates that these predictions may not hold when consumer search costs are important. A model is developed to show how advertisin...

Direct-to-consumer drug advertising has recently become an important and controversial component of drug marketing. In this paper we examine one of the claimed benefits of drug advertising: encouraging the undiagnosed to seek out medical treatment. Using detailed person-level panel data on more than 30,000 individuals from the Medical Care Expenditure Panel Survey, we measure how advertising af...

Drawing on data from an annual French guidebook published in 2004, this paper focuses on the determinants of experts’ ratings on Cuban cigars. We find that high quality cigars are more likely to be recommended to more experienced cigar lovers. Both the selfassessed quality and recommendation depend on the length and diameter of the cigars, but also on more subjective characteristics like number...

If a product has two dimensions of quality, one observable and one not, a firm can use observable quality as a signal of unobservable quality. The correlation between consumers’ valuation of high quality in each dimension is a key determinant of the feasibility of such signaling. A firm may use price alone as a signal, or price and quality together. Both signals tend to be used when the market ...

We examine how trust is sustained in large societies with random matching, when the player to be trusted may default voluntarily or involuntarily. In order to incentivize trustworthiness, defaulters should be punished through temporarily exclusion.The difficulty is that trusting defaulters who are the verge of rehabilitation is profitable. With perfect bounded information, defaulter exclusion u...

eBay’s feedback mechanism is considered crucial to establishing and maintaining trust on the world’s largest trading platform. The effects of a user’s reputation on the probability of sale and on prices are at the center of a large number of studies. More recent theoretical work considers aspects of the mechanism itself. Yet, there is confusion amongst users about its exact institutional detail...

We model asymmetric information arising from physician agency, and its effect on the design of payment and healthcare quantity. The physician-patient coalition aims to maximize a combination of physician profit and patient benefit. The degree of substitution between profit and patient benefit in the physician-patient coalition is the physician’s private information, as is the patient’s intrinsi...

With a large nationwide retailer, we run a natural field experiment to measure the effects of energy use information disclosure, rebates, and sales agent incentives on demand for energy efficient durable goods. Sales incentives and rebates are complementary, but information and sales incentives alone have statistically and economically insignificant effects. Sales agents comply only partially w...

Market outcomes depend on the quality of information available to its participants. We measure the effect of information disclosure on market outcomes using a large-scale field experiment that randomly discloses information about quality in wholesale automobile auctions. As the theoretical literature predicts, information disclosure increases expected revenues. However, in contrast with convent...