A generalization of transferable utility cooperative games from the functional forms introduced by von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944, Theory of Games and Economic Behavior) and Lucas and Thrall (1963, Naval Research Logistics Quarterly, 10, 281–298) is proposed to allow for multiple membership. The definition of the core is adapted analogously and the possibilities for the cross-cutting of cont...

Since the work of von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944), expected utility theory has been the dominant framework for analyzing decision making under uncertainty. Consequently, Borch (1960) also assumed in his pioneering paper on efficient risksharing that all individuals are expected utility maximizers. Since the work of Borch (1960), efficient risk-sharing has been extensively treated in the expe...

The paper introduces a new notion of risk aversion that is independent of the good under observation and its measure scale. The representational framework builds on a time consistent combination of additive separability on certain consumption paths and the von Neumann & Morgenstern (1944) assumptions. In the one-commodity special case, the new notion of risk aversion closely relates to a disent...

The Fudenberg and Maskin (1986) folk theorem for discounted repeated games assumes that the set of feasible payoffs is full dimensional. We obtain the same conclusion using a weaker condition. This condition is that no pair of players has equivalent von Neumann-Morgenstern utilities over outcomes. We term this condition NEU "non-equivalent utilities". The condition is weak, easily interpreted, ...

John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern formulated extensive games in their book: "Theory of Games and Economic Behavior" (1944). A few years later, Kuhn (1953) gave a simpler description of an extensive game, which we will follow here. The description has proved very beneficial for analysing strategic situations with several players. It is general enough to incorporate differences in: the infor...

We reconsider the problem of aggregating individual preference orderings into a single social ordering when alternatives are lotteries and individual preferences are of the von Neumann-Morgenstern type. Relative egalitarianism ranks alternatives by applying the leximin ordering to the distributions of (0-1) normalized utilities they generate. We propose an axiomatic characterization of this agg...

This chapter of a collective book aims at presenting the basics of decision making under risk. We ...rst de...ne notions of risk and increasing risk and recall de...nitions and classi...cations (that are valid independently of any representation) of behavior under risk. We then review the classical model of expected utility due to von Neumann and Morgenstern and its main properties. Issues rais...

This chapter of a collective book aims at presenting the basics of decision making under risk. We ...rst de...ne notions of risk and increasing risk and recall de...nitions and classi...cations (that are valid independently of any representation) of behavior under risk. We then review the classical model of expected utility due to von Neumann and Morgenstern and its main properties. Issues rais...

This paper takes the Anscombe-Aumann framework with horse and roulette lotteries, and applies the Savage axioms to the horse lotteries and the von Neumann-Morgenstern independence axiom to the roulette lotteries. The resulting representation of preferences yields a subjective probability measure over states and two utility functions, one governing risk attitudes and one governing ambiguity atti...

Relative Nash welfarism is a solution to the problem of aggregating von NeumannMorgenstern preferences over a set of lotteries. It ranks such lotteries according to the product of any collection of 0—normalized von Neumann-Morgenstern utilities they generate. We show that this criterion is characterized by the Weak Pareto Principle, Anonymity, and Independence of Harmless Expansions: the social...