Algorithms for pruning game trees generally rely on a game being zero-sum, in the case of alpha-beta pruning, or constant-sum, in the case of multi-player pruning algorithms such as speculative pruning. While existing algorithms can prune non-zero-sum games, pruning is much less effective than in constant-sum games. We introduce the idea of leaf-value tables, which store an enumeration of the p...

Background: One of the goals of criminal policymakers in applying criminal responses is to rehabilitate the offender to avoid repeating his crime. Postponement of sentencing is an institution that can achieve their goals in reforming criminals, and has entered into the Iranian penal system under some French law. The main purpose of this article is to explain the institution of deferral in Irani...

In this lecture we will discuss 2-player zero sum games. Such games are completely competitive , where whatever one player wins, the other must lose. Examples of such games include chess, checkers, backgammon, etc. We will show that in such games: • An equilibrium always exists; • All equilibrium points yield the same payoff for all players; • The set of equilibrium points is actually the carte...

Matching Pennies is a well-known example of a two player, zero-sum game. In this game, each of the players, the matcher and the mismatcher, flips a coin, and the payoffs are determined as follows. If the coins come up matching (i.e., both heads or both tails), then the matcher wins, so the mismatcher pays the matcher the sum of $1. If the coins do not match (i.e., one head and one tail), then t...

Under the notable Issacs’s condition on the Hamiltonian, the existence results of a saddle point are obtained for the stochastic recursive zero-sum differential game and mixed differential game problem, that is, the agents can also decide the optimal stopping time. Themain tools are backward stochastic differential equations BSDEs and double-barrier reflected BSDEs. As the motivation and applic...

It is known that the value of a zero-sum infinitely repeated game with incomplete information on both sides need not exist [1]. It is proved that any number between the minmax and the maxmin of the zero-sum infinitely repeated game with incomplete information on both sides is the value of the long finitely repeated game where players’ information about the uncertain number of repetitions is asy...