A basic model of commitment is to convert a game in strategic form into a “leadership game” where one player commits to a strategy to which the other player chooses a best response, with payoffs as in the original game. This paper studies subgame perfect equilibria of such leadership games for the mixed extension of a finite game, where the leader commits to a mixed strategy. In a generic two-p...

I t is commonly held that increasing monetary rewards enhance work effort. This study, however, argues that this will not ineludibly occur in team activities. Incentive Reversal may occur in sequential team productions featuring positive external impacts on agents. This seemingly paradoxical event is explained through two experiments in this article. The first experiment involves a sample ...

This paper considers a class of two players games in the unit square for which a similar and high enough responsiveness of each player’s strategy to the other player’s strategy around a Nash equilibrium in pure strategies implies (i ) the existence of at least two other Nash equilibria in pure strategies; (ii ) the non local uniqueness of the strategies of this Nash equilibrium in the sets of r...

Simultaneous move games model discrete, multistage interactions where at each stage players simultaneously choose their actions. At each stage, a player does not know what action the other player will take, but otherwise knows the full state of the game. This formalism has been used to express games in general game playing and can also model many discrete approximations of real-world scenarios....

We investigate the motives for cooperation in one-shot Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD). A prior study finds that rates PD games can be ranked empirically by social surplus from cooperation. That employs symmetric payoffs simultaneous games. Hence, setting, it is not possible to discern since three prominent welfare criteria, (efficiency) preferences, Rawlsian maximin and inequity aversion make same pre...

This paper studies equilibrium incentives in a vertically differentiated duopoly with price competition. We analyze one simultaneous-move game and two sequential-move games. In a simultaneous-move game, firms' managers determine their prices simultaneously in the first stage of the game and in the second stage two firms determine incentive schemes. One sequential-move game considers the case in...

background: hemophilia is a chronic bleeding disease and can interfere with daily performance of children. these children require continuous training to prevent bleeding. since children nurses play an important role in the education of sick children and their self-efficacy and the increase use of educational computer games, the use of educational games for teaching self-efficacy to children wit...

This paper investigates value function approximation in the context of zero-sum Markov games, which can be viewed as a generalization of the Markov decision process (MDP) framework to the two-agent case. We generalize error bounds from MDPs to Markov games and describe generalizations of reinforcement learning algorithms to Markov games. We present a generalization of the optimal stopping probl...

Based on our experience, we believe that games, competition and teamwork offer a pleasant and active way of learning. This is much more efficient when the learner has a smile on his face, when he is astonished and curious about next levels and finds the game sufficiently challenging and fun to try again. Our application proposal has the purpose of implementing an e-Learning platform for improvi...

We study in the laboratory threeand four-player, two-action, dominance solvable games of complete information. We consider sequential and simultaneous versions of games that have the same equilibrium actions, and use mousetracking to determine which payoffs subjects pay attention to. We find slightly more equilibrium choices in sequential than in simultaneous, and an overall good fit of level k...