Voting has been an accepted means for electing candidates, receiving public approval for referendums and budgets, and for many other tasks where the will of the people, whether a broad population or a select group, can be recorded and measured in a tangible way. Because of advances in technology, together with problems inherent in manual forms of voting, the concepts and issues relating to elec...

Electronic voting (e-voting) systems can greatly enhance the efficiency, and potentially, the transparency of national elections. However, the security of such systems is an area of on-going research. The literature for secure e-voting is predominantly concerned with 1-out-of-m voting strategies, where m is the number of candidates running for the elections. This paper presents a case study of ...

Electronic voting has found wider acceptance both in developed and developing countries in the recent past. The current research focuses mainly in the area of privacy and security aspects of e-voting. In spite of the good security and privacy features, the existing e-voting protocols remain useful only to small elections or just to support the conventional voting, mainly because of their high c...

We present a secure and available electronic voting service suitable for a large-scale distributed system such as the Internet. The proposed service is based on replication and tolerates both benign and fully arbitrary failures. If enough servers are correct, service availability and security are ensured despite the presence of faulty servers and malicious voters. A voter that is affected by a ...

Anonymity and verifiability are crucial security requirements for voting. Still, they seem to be contradictory, and confusion exists about their precise meanings and compatibility. In this paper, we resolve the confusion by showing that both can be expressed in terms of (un)linkability: while anonymity requires unlinkability of voter and vote, verifiability requires linkability of voters and el...

Security on electronic voting systems is fundamental; it must assure the integrity of all the elements involved or generated during a voting process. This paper presents a design of secure architectures for providing security, integrity and authenticity of the most important elements involved in an electoral process: configuration files, recorded votes and final result files. Also, different cr...

The Open Voting Consortium has a developed a prototype voting system with a modular voting architecture that includes an open source, PC-based voting machine that prints an accessible, voter-verified paper ballot along with an electronic audit trail. This system was designed for reliability, security, privacy, accessibility and auditability. This paper describes some of the privacy consideratio...

This paper covers the some of the security issues in current electronic voting systems. There are many problems with current electronic voting systems . The certification of systems in the USA is done without public input, and the resulting certification reports are kept secret. Many machines lack external audit capabilit ies such as a voter verifiable paper trail. Many systems can be easily ha...

About half of Americans have limited confidence that their vote will be properly counted. These fears have focused attention on voting system reliability, security, and usability. Over the last decade, substantial research on voting systems has demonstrated that many systems are less usable and secure than they should be. Producing truly reliable voting systems demands more than just following ...