We consider a single-item private values auction setting with endogenous costly entry. We demonstrate that for symmetric bidders and entry costs that are an arbitrary linear function of value, a unique symmetric Bayes-Nash “cutoff equilibrium” (where only agents with value above some threshold enter) obtains under the Vickrey auction and also a broader class of revenue-redistributing auctions. ...

We study indirect mechanisms in a setting where both objects and privatelyinformed buyers arrive stochastically to a market. The seller in this setting faces a sequential allocation problem, and must elicit the private information of the dynamic population of buyers in order to achieve her desired outcome—either an efficient or a revenuemaximizing allocation. We propose a simple indirect mechan...

Collusion between suppliers in reverse auctions may damage buyers’ benifits and then lower efficiency of resource allocation. Under first-price sealed-bid reverse auction mechanism, suppliers' equilibrium bidding strategy and buyers' revenue loss was analyzed considering collusion. Then some general conclusions were given: suppliers' bidding strategy is relevant to some factors such as valuatio...

This paper studies revenue-sharing contracts in distribution chains in the presence of win-win conditions. Revenue-sharing contracts are a mechanism to coordinate the firms in a distribution chain. Under these contracts the retailer shares its revenue with the supplier in exchange for a lower wholesale price. The win-win conditions are natural conditions requiring that the profit of any firm ma...

Recently both the range and the value of objects sold by auction have grown tremendously. An auction is an exchange mechanism with asymmetric information. Auctions are so popular because when the seller is unsure about the value that bidders assign to the sold objects, one possible way to reveal the bidder who is willing to pay the highest price for the object is to apply an appropriate auction...

The withdrawal of water for i r r igat ion in the d ryer regions of Mexico already accounts for some 91% of potential availabil i ty. Fur ther expansion of i r r igated acreage, therefore, must re ly more on increased water use efficiency ra ther than increased supply from engineering works. A pr ime ins t rument to br ing about such an improvement could be an appropriate water pr ic ing s t ru...

This paper uses analytically tractable and numerically solved general equilibrium models to examine the significance of pre-existing distortions in factor markets for revenueneutral environmental tax reforms and for various policies involving pollution quotas and permits. Results indicate that pre-existing factor taxes generally raise the costs of these environmental policies. This reflects a t...

We study the simultaneous optimization of efficiency and revenue in pay-per-click keyword auctions in a Bayesian setting. Our main result is that the efficient keyword auction yields near-optimal revenue even under modest competition. In the process, we build on classical results in auction theory to prove that increasing the number of bidders by the number of slots outweighs the benefit of emp...