In response to the judgement-proofness problem many countries consider the extension of liability for environmental damages to lenders to wealth-constrained, environmentally risky businesses. We analyze a simple model of vicarious liability and show that using the deep pockets of lenders for liability enhances safety only if the lender has high bargaining power when bargaining with a ̄rm about ...

A mechanism is pairwise strategy-proof if groups of size one and two never have an incentive to manipulate. When agents have strict preferences over their own outcomes, I show that pairwise strategy-proofness even eliminates incentives for any group of agents to manipulate, therefore implying group strategy-proofness. It is also equivalent to Maskin monotonicity. I obtain the equivalence result...

In this note we define generalized monotonicity which is a generalized version of monotonicity due to Muller and Satterthwaite (1979) for a social choice function under individual preferences which permit indifference, and shall show that generalized monotonicity and strategy−proofness are equivalent. I would like to thank Bhaskar Dutta and the anonymous referee for helpful comments. Citation: ...

We study dominant strategy implementation especially in economic environments. Wefirst show that in general environments, strategy-proofness and quasi-strong-non-bossiness together are necessary and sufficient for dominant strategy implementation via the associated direct revelationmechanism. Wenext prove that in weak separable environments, strategy-proofness is sufficient for dominant strateg...

We propose a new approach to the normative analysis of public-good provision. In addition to individual incentive compatibility, we impose conditions of robust implementability and coalition proofness. Under these additional conditions, participants’ contributions can only depend on the level of public-good provision. For a public good that comes as a single indivisible unit, provision can only...

This paper studies the relation between Bayesian mechanism design and the Ramsey-Boiteux approach to the provision and pricing of excludable public goods. For a large economy with private information about individual preferences, the two approaches are shown to be equivalent if and only if, in addition to incentive compatibility and participation constraints, the …nal allocation of private-good...