This work is intended as an introduction to cryptographic security and a motivation for the widely used Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) security definition. We review the notion of security necessary for a protocol to be usable in a larger cryptographic context, i.e., for it to remain secure when composed with other secure protocols. We then derive the corresponding security criterion for QKD. W...

Recent advances in quantum key distribution (QKD) have given rise to systems that operate at transmission periods significantly shorter than the dead times of their component single-photon detectors. As systems continue to increase in transmission rate, security concerns associated with detector dead times can limit the production rate of sifted bits. We present a model of highspeed QKD in this...

It is often claimed that the security of quantum key distribution (QKD) is guaranteed by the laws of physics. However, this claim is content-free if the underlying theoretical definition of QKD is not actually compatible with the laws of physics. This paper observes that (1) the laws of physics pose serious obstacles to the security of QKD and (2) the same laws are ignored in all QKD “security ...

In our continuous variable quantum key distribution (QKD) scheme, the homodyne detection set-up requires balancing the intensity of an incident beam between two photodiodes. Realistic lens systems are insufficient to provide a spatially stable focus in the presence of large spatial beam-jitter caused by atmospheric transmission. We therefore present an improved geometry for optical tapers which...

We introduce an efficient random key pre-distribution scheme (RKPS) whose performance is 2 to 3 orders of magnitude better than schemes of comparable complexity in the literature. This dramatic improvement is achieved by increasing insecure storage complexity (for example using external flash memory). The proposed scheme is a combination of the Kerberos-like key distribution scheme (KDS) propos...

The paper [Howard E. Brandt, ”Conclusive eavesdropping in quantum key distribution,” J. Opt. B: Quantum Semiclass. Opt. 7 (2005)] is generalized to include the full range of error rates for the projectively measured quantum cryptographic entangling probe, and also the full range of inconclusive rates for the entangling probe measured with the POVM receiver.

Karol Horodecki, Micha l Horodecki, Pawe l Horodecki, Debbie Leung, Jonathan Oppenheim Department of Mathematics, Physics and Computer Science, University of Gdańsk, 80–952 Gdańsk, Poland Faculty of Applied Physics and Mathematics, Technical University of Gdańsk, 80–952 Gdańsk, Poland Institute for Quantum Computing, University of Waterloo, Waterloo, Ontario, N2L1N8, Canada and Department of Ap...

A sensor node is composed of different parts including processing units, sensor, transmitter, receiver, and security unit. There are many nodes in a sensor unit. These networks can be used for military, industrial, medicine, environmental, house, and many other applications. These nodes may be established in the lands of enemies to monitor the relations. Hence, it is important to consider conse...

Probabilistic Key pre-distribution schemes (P-KPSs) are candidates for securing interactions between resource limited computer networks. Collusion susceptible P-KPSs are trade-offs between security and complexity and security include resistance to passive eavesdropping attacks, and active message injection attacks. The existing work presented the P-KPS, the subset keys and identity tickets (SKI...

The main requirement in wireless sensor networks is not only the security but also the energy efficient security due to limited resources. In large scale deployment scenarios, there is no priory knowledge of post deployment network configuration since nodes may be randomly scattered over a hostile territory. Thus, shared keys must be distributed before deployment to provide each node some keys....