Does party organization still matter? Much of the party literature suggests that politicians, who can use substitutes like mass media to win votes, lack incentives to invest in party organization. Yet it remains an electoral asset, especially at lower levels of government. Evidence from Brazil’s Workers’ Party (PT) indicates that party elites invest in organization when they prioritize lower-le...

I study electoral competition between established parties under threat of entry by a challenger under nonmajoritarian run-off elections. In contrast with classical majoritarian run-off elections, I show how nonmajoritarian rules can facilitate two-party systems, including those in which the established parties deter the challenger’s entry by adopting differentiated platforms. I also show that n...

The focus of this paper is that actual political systems do not appear to satisfy the property of convergence to an electoral center that is often predicted by formal vote models. The key theoretical idea is that the convergence result need not hold if there is an asymmetry in the electoral perception of the “quality” of party leaders (Stokes 1992). The average weight given to the perceived qua...

Can electoral rules be designed to achieve political ideals such as accurate representation of voter preferences and accountable governments? The academic literature commonly divides electoral systems into two types, majoritarian and proportional, and implies a straightforward trade-off by which having more of an ideal that a majoritarian system provides means giving up an equal measure of what...

The origins of electoral systems have received scant attention in the literature. Looking at the history of electoral rules in the advanced world in the last century, this paper shows that the existing wide variation in electoral rules across nations can be traced to the strategic decisions that the current ruling parties, anticipating the coordinating consequences of different electoral regime...

We present a model of multi-party, “spatial” competition under proportional rule with both electoral and coalitional risk. Each party consists of a set of delegates with heterogeneous policy preferences. These delegates choose one delegate as leader or agent. This agent announces the policy declaration (or manifesto) to the electorate prior to the election. The choice of the agent by each party...

The weakness of democratic institutions represents the core problem faced by processes of democratic consolidation. The present paper, which confines its attention exclusively to party systems, starts by diagnosing a double deficit. First, the concept of institutional ‘underdevelopment’ appears to be somewhat underdeveloped itself. It requires further clarification and elaboration. Second, the ...

We derive a unified statistical method with which one can produce substantially improved definitions and estimates of almost any feature of two-party electoral systems that can be defined based on district vote shares. Our single method enables one to calculate more efficient estimates, with more trustworthy assessments of their uncertainty, than each of the separate multifarious existing measu...