We study the problem of matching bidders to items where each bidder i has general, strictly monotonic utility functions ui,j(pj) expressing his utility of being matched to item j at price pj . For this setting we prove that a bidder optimal outcome always exists, even when the utility functions are non-linear and noncontinuous. We give sufficient conditions under which every mechanism that find...

We consider the problem of all-to-one selfish routing in the absence of a payment scheme in wireless sensor networks, where a natural model for cost is the power required to forward, referring to the resulting game as a Locally Minimum Cost Forwarding (LMCF). Our objective is to characterize equilibria and their global costs in terms of stretch and diameter, in particular finding incentive comp...

I explicitly derive the optimal dynamic incentive contract in a general continuous-time agency problem where inducing static first-best action is not always optimal. My framework generates two dynamic contracts new to the literature: (1) a “quiet-life” arrangement and (2) a suspension-based endogenously renegotiating contract. Both contractual forms induce a mixture of first-best and non-first-...

Traffic congestion has dire economic and social impacts in modern metropolitan areas. To address this problem, paper we introduce a novel type of model-free transactive controllers to manage vehicle traffic highway networks for which precise mathematical models are not available. Specifically, consider system with managed lanes on dynamic tolling mechanisms can be implemented real-time using me...

In the sales law of most countries the duration of the buyer’s claim for remedies is cut off by a statute of limitations. The present article argues that there is a rationale for cutting off the buyer’s claim, and also determines the optimal length of the cut-off period. Essentially, allowing claims strengthens the seller’s incentive to provide goods of durable quality, but may lead the parties...

Suppose that a group of people meet to determine the cost allocation of a collective action, and that each individual’s valuation of the collective action is private and independent of all others’ values. With this information structure there is an incentive problem—each individual has an incentive to understate value in order to lower his or her cost share of the collective action. This paper ...

We propose an incentive scheme based on intervention to sustain cooperation among selfinterested users. In the proposed scheme, an intervention device collects imperfect signals about the actions of the users for a test period, and then chooses the level of intervention that degrades the performance of the network for the remaining time period. We analyze the problems of designing an optimal in...