Classical Bayesian mechanism design is “centralized”, that is, the designer is assumed to know thedistribution D from which the players’ type profile has been drawn. We instead investigate a very “de-centralized” Bayesian model, where the designer has no knowledge at all, and each player only has someprobabilistic information about D.For this decentralized model and many con...

Mechanism Design is the algorithmic component of Game Theory, the synthesis of protocols for selfish parties to achieve certain properties. A protocol is a me thod to aggregate the preferences of the parties in order to decide on some "social choice," where typical examples include: deciding whether a community should build a bridge, how to route packets in a network and deciding who wins an au...

We deal with scheduling-type multi-agent projects, where the workflow of each task may contain chance events and decision opportunities. In this case, global efficiency requires each agent to make his decisions depending on all the current states of the work processes of all agents. But if the current state of each task is hidden then we also need to get the agents interested in sharing this in...

This paper identifies mechanisms that are implementable even when the planner cannot commit to the rules of the mechanism. The standard approach is to require mechanism to be robust against redesign. This often leads nonexistence of acceptable mechanisms. The novelty of this paper to require robustness against redesigns that are themselves robust against redesigns that are themselves robust aga...