We investigate CEO compensation for completing M&A deals. We find that CEOs who have more power to influence board decisions receive significantly larger bonuses. We also find a positive relation between bonus compensation and measures of effort, but not between bonus compensation and deal performance. CEOs with more power also tend to engage in larger deals relative to the size of their own fi...

In an AT&T longitudinal study of managers, managerial success after sixteen years is predicted by “responsible power,” which is a combination of TAT-based measures of power motivation and responsibility. These results are consistent with previous theory and research on leadership, and are similar to those obtained with the leadership motive pattern, on the same sample, by McClelland and Boyatzi...

We simultaneously analyze two mechanisms of the managerial labor market (CEO turnover and remuneration schemes) in two different regulatory regimes, namely before and after the sweeping governance reforms adopted in the UK in the 1990s. We employ sample selection models to examine firms in a pre-Cadbury Code period (1988-1993) and a post-Combined Code period (1998-2004). CEOs’ compensation and ...