Dziembowski, Pietrzak, and Wichs (ICS–2010) introduced the notion of non-malleable codes as a useful message integrity assurance for scenarios where error-correction or, even, errordetection is impossible. Intuitively, a non-malleable code ensures that the tampered codeword encodes the original message or a message that is entirely independent of the original message. However, if the family of ...

Non-malleable codes, introduced by Dziembowski, Pietrzak and Wichs [DPW10], provide a useful message integrity guarantee in situations where traditional error-correction (and even error-detection) is impossible; for example, when the attacker can completely overwrite the encoded message. Informally, a code is non-malleable if the message contained in a modified codeword is either the original m...

We present a constant-round non-malleable commitment scheme based on the existence of sub-exponential one-way functions and using a blackbox proof of security. As far as we know, this is the first construction of a constant-round non-malleable protocol based on only one-wayness, or to admit a black-box proof of security under any standard-type assumption.

Non-malleable codes, introduced by Dziembowski, Pietrzak, and Wichs (ICS ’10) provide the guarantee that if a codeword c of a message m, is modified by a tampering function f to c′, then c′ either decodes to m or to “something unrelated” to m. It is known that non-malleable codes cannot exist for the class of all tampering functions and hence a lot of work has focused on explicitly constructing...

A recent trend towards integrating FPGAs with many heterogeneous components, such as memory systems, dedicated multipliers, etc., has made them an attractive option for implementing many embedded systems. Paradoxically, the integration that makes modern FPGAs an attractive computing substrate also makes the development of energy efficient FPGA designs very challenging in practice. This is due t...

We show the existence of concurrent non-malleable commitments based on the existence one-way functions. Our proof of security only requires the use of black-box techniques, and additionally provides an arguably simplified proof of the existence of even stand-alone secure non-malleable commitments. Cornell University, E-Mail: [email protected] Cornell University, E-Mail: [email protected]...

We consider the execution of two-party protocols in the presence of an adversary that has full control of the communication channel between the parties. The adversary has the power to omit, insert or modify messages at its choice. It has also full control over the scheduling of the messages. The honest parties are not necessarily aware to the existence of the adversary, and are not allowed to u...

Dodis and Wichs [DW09] introduced the notion of a non-malleable extractor to study the problem of privacy amplification with an active adversary. A non-malleable extractor is a much stronger version of a strong extractor. Given a weakly-random string x and a uniformly random seed y as the inputs, the non-malleable extractor nmExt has the property that nmExt(x, y) appears uniform even given y as...