نتایج جستجو برای: kent
تعداد نتایج: 4039 فیلتر نتایج به سال:
1Regenstrief Institute, Inc. Indianapolis, In, UsA; 2Indiana University Center for Aging Research; 3Department of Medicine, Indiana University school of Medicine, Indianapolis, In, UsA; 4Wishard health services, Indianapolis, In, UsA; 5school of Pharmacy and Pharmaceutical sciences, Purdue University, West Lafayette, In, UsA; 6Kent Institute of Medicine and health sciences, University of Kent, ...
The University of Kent at Canterbury PSSRU Cornwallis Building, University of Kent at Canterbury, Canterbury, Kent CT2 7NF Tel: 01227 823963 Fax: 01227 827038 Email: [email protected] Site Director: Professor Ann Netten The London School of Economics PSSRU London School of Economics, Houghton Street, London WC2 2AE Tel: 020 7955 6238 Fax: 020 7955 6131 Email: [email protected] Site Director: Profe...
This paper reconciles the two explanations of a financial crisis, the self-fulfilling prophecy and the fundamental causes, in an empirically-relevant framework, by explicitly modeling the costly voluntary acquisition of information about fundamentals in a variant of Diamond and Dybvig (1983). In the “run” equilibrium investors engage in costly evaluation of projects, so that banks with lower-re...
In a finite-trader version of the Diamond-Dybvig (1983) model, the symmetric, ex-ante efficient allocation is implementable by a direct mechanism (i.e., each trader announces the type of his own ex-post preference) in which truthful revelation is the strictly dominant strategy for each trader. When the model is modified by formalizing the sequential-service constraint (cf. Wallace, 1988), the t...
We study the Diamond-Dybvig model of financial intermediation (JPE, 1983) under the assumption that depositors have information about previous decisions. Depositors decide sequentially whether to withdraw their funds or continue holding them in the bank. If depositors observe the history of all previous decisions, we show that there are no bank runs in equilibrium independently of whether the r...
Green and Lin study a version of the Diamond-Dybvig model with a finite number of agents, independent determination of each agent’s type (impatient or patient), and sequential service. For special preferences, they show that the ex ante first-best allocation is the unique equilibrium outcome of the model with private information about types. For general preferences, we show, via a simple argume...
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