A risk neutral buyer observes a private signal s ∈ [a, b], which informs her that the mean and variance of a normally distributed risky asset are s and σ s respectively. She then sets a price at which to acquire the asset owned by risk averse “outsiders”. Assume σ s ∈ { 0, σ } for some σ > 0 and let B = { s ∈ [a, b] | σ s = 0 } . If B = ∅, then there exists a fully revealing equilibrium in whic...

We show that when agents become informationally negligible in a large economy with asymmetric information, every ex ante efficient allocation must be incentive compatible. This means that any ex ante core or Walrasian allocation is incentive compatible. The corresponding result is false for fixedfinite-agent economies with asymmetric information. An example is also constructed to show that the ...

We consider the problem of efficient mechanism design for multilateral trading of multiple goods with independent private types for players and incomplete information among them. The problem is partly motivated by an efficient resource allocation problem in communication networks where there are both buyers and sellers. In such a setting, ex post budget balance and individual rationality are ke...

Hatfield and Milgrom (2005) present a unified model of matching with contracts, which includes the standard two-sided matching and some package auction models as special cases. They show that the doctor-optimal stable mechanism is strategy-proof for doctors if hospitals’ preferences satisfy substitutes and the law of aggregate demand. We show that the doctor-optimal stable mechanism is group st...

This paper considers the incentive compatibility in many-to-many two-sided matching problems. We first show that the Blocking Lemma holds for many-to-many matchings under the extended max-min preference criterion and quota-saturability condition. This result extends the Blocking Lemma for one-to-one matching and for many-to-one matching to many-to-many matching problem. It is then shown that th...

We study mechanisms that operate in interdependent values environments. show when defined on knit and strict environments, only constant can be ex post incentive compatible. Knitness is also necessary for this result to hold with two alternatives the range. For partially we prove compatibility extends groups, strategy-proofness implies strong group special case of private values. The results ex...

For every sports tournament, it is an important requirement to provide contestants with the appropriate incentives perform. However, incentive compatibility usually considered all or nothing (binary) concept in academic literature, that is, rules are proved be either strategy-proof vulnerable manipulation. Our paper aims present a method for quantifying violation of this theoretical property th...