Field Editor: G. Cassar Wedocument the role of entrepreneurial founder and venture capital (VC) partner co-ethnicity in shaping investment relationships. Co-ethnicity increases the likelihood that a VC firm invests in a company. Conditional on investment, co-ethnicity strengthens the degree of involvement by raising the likelihood of VC board of director involvement and increasing the size and ...

Contributing to the literature on local bias, we examine how the direct and indirect network ties of financial intermediaries mitigate two types of information problems, the identification of investment opportunities and the evaluation of their quality. In our analysis of the non-domestic IPOs and trade sales exits of European venture capitalbacked companies, we find that direct and indirect ne...

A dealer needs access to order flow and information to make a market profitably in a Nasdaq stock. Several variables that proxy for the stocks that an individual market maker’s brokerage customers trade, including volume, location, underwriting participation and analyst coverage, are significant determinants of market making activity. Informational advantages may also factor in the market makin...

Using Japanese firms that went public during the period 1998-2006, we find that independent venture capitalist-backed IPO firms are significantly younger and smaller than IPO companies backed by venture capital firms that are subsidiaries of financial institutions. Independent venture capitalists tend to make firms go public on stock exchanges with less strict listing requirements. Importantly,...

We provide new rationales for corporate venturing (CV), based on competition for talented managers. As returns to venturing increase, …rms engage in CV for reasons other than capturing these returns. First, higher venturing returns increase managerial compensation, to which …rms respond by increasing the power of incentives. Managers increase e¤ort, prompting …rms to reallocate them to new vent...

We analyze the role of intermediaries on electronic markets using detailed data of more than 14,000 originated loans on an electronic P2P (person-to-person) lending platform. On such an electronic credit market lenders bid for supplying a private loan. Screening of potential borrowers and the monitoring of loan repayment can be delegated to designated group leaders. We find that these participa...

We use an economic experiment to examine the impact of an ambiguous level of asymmetric information on the behavior of security dealers. Specifically, we distinguish three types of uncertainty with respect to informed trading: risk, compound risk, and ambiguity; for both a monopoly and a duopoly market setting. We find that dealer’s bidding behavior is less aggressive under an ambiguous level o...

This article shows that investors financing a portfolio of projects may use the depth of their financial pockets to overcome entrepreneurial incentive problems. Competition for scarce informed capital at the refinancing stage strengthens investors’ bargaining positions. And yet, entrepreneurs’ incentives may be improved, because projects funded by investors with ‘‘shallow pockets’’ must have no...

We study incentive provision in a model of securities issuance with an informed issuer and uninformed investors. We show that the presence of an informed intermediary may increase surplus even if we allow for collusion between the intermediary and the issuer. Collusion is neutralized by introducing a misalignment between the interests of the issuer and those of the intermediary. To achieve this...

Takeover target firms covered by more equity analysts are sold for higher premiums while their acquirers earn lower merger announcement returns. We confirm these results using exogenous shocks to coverage arising from brokerage-house mergers or closures (i.e., quasi-natural experiments) as instruments for the loss of analyst coverage. In general, our findings indicate that target coverage by eq...