Abstract We introduce a new class of values for TU-games (games with transferable utility) level structure, called LS-games. A structure is hierarchical where each corresponds to partition the player set, which becomes increasingly coarse from trivial containing only singletons grand coalition. The values, Harsanyi support levels solutions, extend solutions As an important subset these we prese...

In this paper standard oligopolies are interpreted in two ways, namely as oligopolies without transferable technologies and as oligopolies with transferable technologies. From a cooperative point of view this leads to two diierent classes of cooperative games. We show that cooperative oligopoly games without transferable technologies are convex games and that cooperative oligopoly games with tr...

Coco (“cooperative/competitive”) values are a solution concept for two-player normalform games with transferable utility, when binding agreements and side payments between players are possible. In this paper, we show that coco values can also be defined for stochastic games and can be learned using a simple variant of Q-learning that is provably convergent. We provide a set of examples showing ...

A generalization of transferable utility cooperative games from the functional forms introduced by von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944, Theory of Games and Economic Behavior) and Lucas and Thrall (1963, Naval Research Logistics Quarterly, 10, 281–298) is proposed to allow for multiple membership. The definition of the core is adapted analogously and the possibilities for the cross-cutting of cont...

We consider a class of cooperative differential games with continuous updating making use the Pontryagin maximum principle. It is assumed that at each moment, players have or information about game structure defined in closed time interval fixed duration. Over time, will be updated. The subject current paper to construct players’ strategies, their trajectory, characteristic function, and soluti...

We consider transferable utility cooperative games (TU games) with limited cooperation introduced by a hypergraph communication structure, the so-called games. A structure is given collection of coalitions, hyperlinks hypergraph, for which it assumed that only coalitions are or connected unions able to cooperate and realize their worth. introduce average tree value games, assigns each player pl...

This paper considers situations characterized by a common-pool resource, which needs to be divided among agents. Each of the agents has some claim on this pool and an individual reward function for assigned resources. This paper analyzes not only the problem of maximizing the total joint reward, but also the allocation of these rewards among the agents. Analyzing these situations a new class of...

We design a simple protocol of coalition formation. A society grows up by sequentially incorporating new members. The negotiations are always bilateral. We study this protocol in the context of non-transferable utility (NTU) games in characteristic function form. When the corresponding NTU game (N,V ) satisfies that V (N) is flat, the only payoff which arises in equilibrium is the Shapley NTU v...