This paper investigates the diffusion of system dynamics as research paradigm. It deals with the question whether the diffusion of system dynamics is influenced by network externalities. Assuming the existence of such network externalities the so called penguin and bandwagon effect must be considered regarding the diffusion. Based on a system dynamics model considering network externalities lev...

Growing load and deterioration of the environment can be interpreted as a result of some external effects interventions. While the positive externalities influence the positive productional and utilizational functions of other subjects, the negative externalities influence the negative ones. Both types of external effects can act as parcial or global externalities. Linking of environmental issu...

This paper endogenizes the timing of bilateral contracting between one principal and multiple agents in the presence of externalities. Contracting simultaneously with all agents is optimal for the principal if externalities become weaker the more an agent trades. If instead externalities become stronger, sequential negotiations might benefit the principal as they lower the agents’ outside optio...

This paper studies infinite-horizon bargaining between a seller and multiple buyers when externalities are present. We extend the analysis in Jehiel & Moldovanu (1995a) by allowing for both pure and mixed equilibria. A characterization of the stationary subgame perfect equilibria in generic games is presented. Equilibria with delay exist only for strong positive externalities. Since each buyer ...

Rapidly increasing motorization in China, particularly private automobiles, creates both economic and individual benefits, as well as externalities and indirect negative impacts. Such externalities could be adapted and mitigated relatively easily when the rate of motorization growth is low. However, when the number of private automobiles rises by 15 to 20 percent per year and is heavily concent...

We consider environments in which agents can cooperate on multiple issues and externalities are present both within and across issues. We propose a way to extend (Shapley) values that have been put forward to deal with externalities within issues to games where there are externalities within and across issues. We characterize our proposal through axioms that extend the Shapley axioms to our mor...

Consider an urban economy with two types of externalities, negative traffic congestion externalities and positive agglomeration externalities deriving from non-market interaction. Suppose that urban travel can be tolled, that non-market interaction cannot be subsidized, and that non-market interaction is stimulated by a reduction in travel costs. Then the optimal toll is below the congestion ex...