Extortion strategies can dominate any opponent in an iterated prisoner's dilemma game. But if players are able to adopt the strategies performing better, extortion becomes widespread and evolutionary unstable. It may sometimes act as a catalyst for the evolution of cooperation, and it can also emerge in interactions between two populations, yet it is not the evolutionarily stable outcome. Here ...

The problem of dynamic spectrum sharing in a cognitive radio network where multiple bounded rational secondary users compete with each other is addressed. The evolutionary game theory is presented to investigate the dynamic strategies of secondary users. Using replicated dynamics, the proposed game is converging to the evolutionary stable equilibrium. Moreover, a punishment mechanism is introdu...

The evolutionary strategies that emerge within populations can be dictated by numerous factors, including interactions with other species. In this paper, we explore the consequences of such a scenario using a host-parasite system of human concern. By analyzing the dynamical behaviors of a mathematical model we investigate the evolutionary outcomes resulting from interactions between Schistosoma...

Game theory focuses on payoffs and typically ignores time constraints that play an important role in evolutionary processes where the repetition of games can depend on the strategies, too. We introduce a matrix game under time constraints, where each pairwise interaction has two consequences: both players receive a payoff and they cannot play the next game for a specified time duration. Thus ou...

We investigate two methods of measuring fitness in evolutionary games played among members of a finite population. Classical notions of stability account for the action of selection only, and use immediate reproductive gains as a measure of fitness. This classical interpretation of fitness is what we call reproductive fitness (RF), and is found in the early studies of evolutionary stability in ...

By applying a technique previously developed to study ecosystem assembly [Capitán et al., Phys. Rev. Lett. 103, 168101 (2009)] we study the evolutionary stable strategies of iterated 2 × 2 games. We focus on memory-one strategies, whose probability to play a given action depends on the actions of both players in the previous time step. We find the asymptotically stable populations resulting fro...

Knowing the strategy of an opponent in a competitive environment conveys obvious evolutionary advantages. But this information is costly, and the benefit of being informed may not necessarily offset the additional cost. Here we introduce social dilemmas with informed strategies, and we show that this gives rise to two cyclically dominant triplets that form defensive alliances. The stability of ...

Evolutionary dynamics model the changes in state of a population and strategies used by individuals population. One gets different based on types dependence fitness or revision protocols. In this paper we define Perturbed Best Response (PBR), Brown-von Neumann-Nash (BNN), Replicator Projection for stochastic games, using framework evolutionary games. We also class stable discuss their propertie...

Computational modeling is an important tool in the study of language evolution. It is not only used to test hypotheses, but also as a source of data on difficult to observe evolutionary dynamics. This makes it particularly important to distinguish the emergent behaviors of evolutionary systems being studied, from the behaviors of specific models. In this paper we provide an in-depth analysis of...

Ownership and trade emerge from anarchy as evolutionary stable strategies. In these evolutionary game models, ownership status provides an endogenous asymmetrizing criterion enabling cheaper resolution of property conflicts. †Assistant Professor, Columbia University, 615 Uris Hall, 3022 Broadway, New York, NY 10027. The author acknowledges financial support from the Brown and Bain Fellowship in...