this paper aims to evaluate inventory cost of a two-echelon serial supply chain system under vendor managed inventory program with stochastic demand, and examine the effect of environmental factors on the cost of overall system. for this purpose, we consider a two-echelon serial supply chain with a manufacturer and a retailer. under vendor managed inventory program, the decision on inventory le...

W e consider a supply chain with a supplier that sells to a retailer under a revenue-sharing arrangement. Demand is uncertain and unobservable to the supplier. We assume that the retailer is rational, that is, the retailer behaves opportunistically and underreports sales revenues to the supplier whenever such underreporting is profitable. Assuming the supplier has the ability to audit the retai...

We study the effects of credit risk in a supply chain where one retailer deals with competing risky suppliers who may default during their production lead-times. The suppliers, who compete for business with the retailer by establishing wholesale prices, are leaders in a Stackelberg game with the retailer. The retailer, facing uncertain future demand, chooses order quantities while weighing the ...

We construct a model of a local ketchup market of a city in Texas that accounts for household, manufacturer, and retailer decisions. That is, the model develops both the demand and the supply side of the market. The demand side is modeled through a latent utility framework allowing for the ‘no-purchase’ option. Accounting for both sides of the market allows one to check for any endogeneity prob...

T paper studies a manufacturer that sells to a newsvendor retailer who can improve the quality of her demand information by exerting costly forecasting effort. In such a setting, contracts play two roles: providing incentives to influence the retailer’s forecasting decision and eliciting information obtained by forecasting to inform production decisions. We focus on two forms of contracts that ...

We study the effects of disruption risk in a supply chain where one retailer deals with competing risky suppliers who may default during their production lead-times. The suppliers, who compete for business with the retailer by establishing wholesale prices, are leaders in a Stackelberg game with the retailer. The retailer, facing uncertain future demand, chooses order quantities while weighing ...

It is common for a retailer to sell products from competing manufacturers. How then should the …rms manage their contract negotiations? The supply chain coordination literature focuses either on a single manufacturer selling to a single retailer or one manufacturer selling to many (possibly competing) retailers. We …nd that some key conclusions from those market structures do not apply in our s...

We develop a price competition model for a new supply chain that competes in a market comprised of some rival supply chains. The new supply chain has one risk-neutral manufacturer and one risk-averse retailer in which the manufacturer is a leader and retailer is a follower. The manufacturer pays a fraction of the risk cost (caused by demand uncertainty) to the retailer. We apply this competitiv...

In this study, the implications of the government’s tariffs on optimal pricing decisions in a dual-channel SC with one manufacturer and one retailer by taking into account the retailer services are examined. First, the best response strategies of retailer and manufacturer have obtained following the government’s tariffs by using a Stackelberg game model. Then, the government problem has modeled...

0377-2217/$ see front matter 2012 Elsevier B.V. A http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2012.09.003 ⇑ Corresponding author. Tel.: +886 35742653; fax: E-mail address: [email protected] (U.-P. Wen This study considers pricing policies in a supply chain with one manufacturer, who sells a product to an independent retailer and directly to consumers through an Internet channel. In addition to the manu...