This paper studies the effects of endogenous party formation on political platforms. It develops a model in which parties allow like-minded citizens to, first, share cost running public election and, second, coordinate policy platform. The characterizes set equilibria with two competing and one uncontested party. In two-party equilibria, distance between both platforms is always positive but li...

We study optimal policy experimentation by a committee. consider dynamic bargaining game in which committee members choose either risky reform or safe alternative each period. When no redistribution is allowed, the unique equilibrium outcome generically inefficient. allowed (even small amounts), there always exists an that supports for any voting rule without veto players. With players, however...

We develop a dynamic model of political competition between two groups that differ in their subjective the data generating process for common outcome. One group has simpler than other as they ignore some relevant policy variables. show cycles must arise and simple world views—which can be interpreted populist views—imply extreme choices. Periods which those with more complex govern increase spe...

We characterize the outcomes of games when players may make binding o ers of strategy contingent side payments before the game is played. This does not always lead to eÆcient outcomes, despite complete information and costless contracting. The characterizations are illustrated in a series of examples, including voluntary contribution public good games, Cournot and Bertrand oligopoly, principal-...

We construct models of group formation designed to capture some of the key features of political and social competition. The models draw on the ‘citizen candidate’ approach and allow competition to be modelled as either compromise where all groups in‡uence outcomes; or con‡ict where one group wins the right to dictate. We also consider both instrumental and expressive approaches to understandin...

This paper studies a cheap talk model in which two senders having partial and non-overlapping private information simultaneously communicate with an uninformed receiver. The sensitivity of the receiver’s ideal action to one sender’s private information depends on the other sender’s private information. We show that the senders’information transmissions exhibit strategic complementarity: more in...

We study the effect of political ideology on sustainable development, measured as investment in genuine wealth, in a dynamic panel of 79 countries between 1981 and 2013. We find that a switch from a left-wing or centrist government to a right-wing government has a robust positive and statistically significant effect on investment in genuine wealth. We find no evidence of opportunistic cycles in...