personal identity is a problem in the possibility of resurrection. what criterion is there that we can say a resurrected man is the same as the expired one? what is the answer in dualism, and what is in physicalism? does this question cause to deny possibility of resurrection? some philosopher claim that we have no criterion for identity between these two. and then, they conclude that after lif...

A satisfactory solution to the mind-problem should answer the two following questions: i) are phenomenal properties, the properties that characterize states of consciousness, physical? ii) how do phenomenal properties causally interact with physical properties? To a first approximation, physicalism and dualism are the two possible answers to the first question. There are three kinds of views re...

In this paper, I observe that Hobbesian physicalism on the one side, and Cartesian dualism on the other, have had a widespread cultural influence on the way we regard ourselves and on the way we behave toward one another. I argue that what we now need is a conceptual space within which we might forge a metaphysical alternative, an alternative that will give us some hope of overcoming the delete...