While some of the questions have been around since Berle and Means (1932), the term \corporate governance" did not exist in the English language until twenty years ago. In the last two decades, however, corporate governance issues have become important not only in the academic literature, but also in public policy debates. During this period, corporate governance has been identi ed with takeove...

This paper explores the question of whether the institution of the stock market is likely to be helpful to low and middle income countries in promoting development of their real economy and ensuring fast industrial growth. The case for and against the stock market inevitably involves a discussion of the important related subjects of corporate finance, corporate governance and corporate law. Con...

We analyze the development of the Swedish ownership model after World War II. The controlling ownership in Swedish firms is typically concentrated to one or two owners. Often, but not always, the controlling owners are Swedish families. Thus, the model resembles the typical corporate control model of Continental Europe. A distinguishing feature of the Swedish model is that control is typically ...

This article provides an analysis of why regulatory competition in corporate law has operated, for the most part, successfully in the United States, and critiques the position of commentators who are skeptical of the significance and extent of state competition. The article begins by setting out the context in which regulatory competition has been most recently criticized, the U.S. Congress’s r...

This paper deals with corporate governance issues and competition policy. The impact of private benefits extraction on the values of oligopolistic firms is analyzed. Private benefits are assumed to generate costs which create price distortion on the product market. For a wide range of industry concentrations, we prove that this may affect the profit (i.e. the value) of the firms in a positive s...

We examine how corporate payout policy is affected by managerial stock incentives using data on more than 1100 nonfinancial firms during 1993-97. We find that management share ownership encourages higher payouts by firms with potentially the greatest agency problems—those with low market-to-book ratios and low management stock ownership. We also find that management stock options change the com...