We characterize the efficiency space of deterministic, dominant-strategy incentive compatible, individually rational and Pareto-optimal combinatorial auctions in a model with two players and k nonidentical items. We examine a model with multidimensional types, private values and quasilinear preferences for the players with one relaxation: one of the players is subject to a publicly known budget...

Winner determination is one of the main challenges in combinatorial auctions. However, not much work has been done to solve this problem in the case of reverse auctions using evolutionary techniques. This has motivated us to propose an improvement of a genetic algorithm based method, we have previously proposed, to address two important issues in the context of combinatorial reverse auctions: d...

Combinatorial auctions have important applications to resource allocation problems. These auctions allow bidders to submit bids for entire packages of goods, rather than on single items. This rich bidder interface allows bidders to specify their preferences more precisely, and as a result, allows for more efficient allocation of resources. However, these allowances to bidders come at a computat...

Auctions are important market mechanisms for the allocation of goods and services. Auctions are preferred often to other common processes because they are open, quite fair, easiness to understand by participants, and lead to economically efficient outcomes. Design of auctions is a multidisciplinary effort made of contributions from economics, operations research, informatics, and other discipli...

Many auctions involve selling several distinct items simultaneously, where bidders can bid on the whole or any part of the lot. Such auctions are referred to as combinatorial auctions. Examples of such auctions include truck delivery routes, furniture, and FCC spectrum. Determining winners in such auctions is an NP-hard problem and significant research is being conducted in this area. However, ...

We survey experimental research on multi-unit auctions with an emphasis on topics that may be of a unifying interest to experimental, as well as theoretical and empirical economists. Topics include static and dynamic multi-unit auctions; combinatorial auctions and efficient auction design; simultaneous and sequential auctions; bidder asymmetry and endogenous entry, and collusion in auctions. We...

We consider a fundamental pricing problem in combinatorial auctions. are given set of indivisible items and buyers with randomly drawn monotone valuations over subsets items. A decision maker sets item prices then the make sequential purchasing decisions, taking their favorite among remaining parametrize an instance by d, size largest buyer may want. Our main result asserts that there exist suc...