SLAyer is a program analysis tool designed to automatically prove memory safety of industrial systems code. In this paper we describe SLAyer’s implementation, and its application to Windows device drivers. This paper accompanies the first release of SLAyer.

Proof-carrying code is a technique that can be used to execute untrusted code safely. A code consumer speci es requirements and safety rules which de ne the safe behavior of a system, and a code producer packages each program with a formal proof that the program satis es the requirements. The consumer uses a fast proof validator to check that the proof is correct, and hence the program is safe....

The continued success of the International Safety Management (ISM) Code is dependent upon the maritime industry seeking to continuously improve our understanding of the strengths and limitations of safety management systems (SMS). To do so we need not only to examine and assess the implementation of the ISM Code to date but, importantly, we need also to review and assess the implementation of S...

It is natural to rely on experiences from the aviation industry when developing safety-critical systems for automotive applications. In the aviation industry for several decades programmable systems have been used for flight control, aircraft engine control, landing gear control etc.. The safety and reliability requirements of these systems are comparable with steer-by-wire or brake-by-wire sys...

We present a methodology and tool for verifying and certifying systems code. The verification is based on the lazy-abstraction paradigm for intertwining the following three logical steps: construct a predicate abstraction from the code, model check the abstraction, and automatically refine the abstraction based on counterexample analysis. The certification is based on the proof-carrying code pa...

Certifying compilation allows a compiler to produce annotations which prove that target code abides by a speciied safety policy. An independent veriier can check the code without needing to trust the compiler. For such a system to be generally useful, the safety policy should be expressive enough to allow diierent compilers to eeectively produce certiiable code. In this work, we use our experie...