Though researchers of interest group behavior consistently note that groups often form coalitions when seeking to influence public policy, questions remain about when groups join forces and whether lobbying in a coalition is more or less effective than lobbying alone. In this paper, I approach these questions with a formal model of interest groups coalition formation among information-providing...

In the last few years, argumentation frameworks have been successfully applied to multi agent systems. Recently, argumentation has been used to provide a framework for reasoning about coalition formation. At the same time alternatingtime temporal logic has been used to reason about the behavior and abilities of coalitions of agents. However, ATL operators account only for the existence of succe...

OBJECTIVE Tarsal coalition is uncommon, but not rare. Since it may present with chronic symptoms and since prior studies have shown that magnetic resonance (MR) has a high accu- racy for diagnosis, we evaluated the prevalence, frequency, location, and types of coalition, as well as secondary signs, as seen in a large clinical MR population. SUBJECTS AND METHODS Initially a "word search" progr...

The Banzhaf index and the Shapley-Shubik index are the best-known and the most used tools to measure political power of voters in a voting system. Most methods to calculate these power indices are based on counting winning coalitions, in particular those coalitions a voter is decisive for. We present a new combinatorial formula to calculate both indices solely using the set of minimal winning c...

Dynamic Coalitions denote a temporary collaboration between different entities to achieve a common goal. A key feature that distinguishes Dynamic Coalitions from static coalitions is Dynamic Membership, where new members can join and others can leave after a coalition is set. This thesis studies workflows in Dynamic Coalitions, by analyzing their features, highlighting their unique characterist...

The Penrose-Banzhaf index and the Shapley-Shubik index are the best-known and the most used tools to measure political power of voters in simple voting games. Most methods to calculate these power indices are based on counting winning coalitions, in particular those coalitions a voter is decisive for. We present a new combinatorial formula how to calculate both indices solely using the set of m...

Abstract We analyse efficient risk-sharing arrangements when the value from deviating is determined endogenously by another arrangement. Coalitions form to insure against idiosyncratic income risk. Self-enforcing contracts for both original coalition and any formed (joined) after deviations rely on a belief in future cooperation which we term “trust”. treat contracting conditions of deviation c...