We argue that, in exchange economies, various versions of the bargaining set cannot be implemented in Nash equilibrium. We then propose an extensive form mechanism that exactly implements the Aumann–Davis–Maschler bargaining set in subgame perfect equilibrium. The mechanism corresponds closely to the description of the bargaining set and respects feasibility in and out of equilibrium. Journal o...

We show the robustness of the Walrasian result obtained in models of bargaining in pairwise meetings. Restricting trade to take place only in pairs, most of the assumptions made in the literature are dispensed with. These include assumptions on preferences (differentiability, monotonicity, strict concavity, bounded curvature), on the set of agents (dispersed characteristics) or on the consumpti...

We study the long-run sustainability of reputations in games with imperfect public monitoring. It is impossible to maintain a permanent reputation for playing a strategy that does not play an equilibrium of the game without uncertainty about types. Thus, a player cannot indefinitely sustain a reputation for non-credible behavior in the presence of imperfect monitoring. Journal of Economic Liter...

Using a purification method introduced earlier based on redox properties it was possible to isolate Sc3N@I(h)-C80 and Sc3N@D(3h)-C78 and a mixture of Sc3N@D(5h)-C80 and Sc3N@D3-C68. Taking advantage of their chemical reactivity differences, Sc3N@D(5h)-C80 was isolated from Sc3N@D3-C68 followed by further functionalization, giving rise to five new methano-derivatives of Sc3N@D(5h)-C80.

A seemingly mild assumption of the standard alternating offers bargaining model under risk is that the breakdown event is not strictly worse than the worst agreement. When this assumption is relaxed the structure of the equilibrium set of agreements changes in an interesting way. We analyse the effect of disagreement on equilibrium, and relate our result to a class of outside option models. Jou...

We provide comparable algorithms for the Dekel-Fudenberg procedure, iterated admissibility and proper rationalizability by means of the concepts of preference restrictions and likelihood orderings. We apply the algorithms for comparing iterated admissibility and proper rationalizability, and provide a sufficient condition under which iterated admissibility does not rule out properly rationaliza...

This paper endogenizes the timing of bilateral contracting between one principal and multiple agents in the presence of externalities. Contracting simultaneously with all agents is optimal for the principal if externalities become weaker the more an agent trades. If instead externalities become stronger, sequential negotiations might benefit the principal as they lower the agents’ outside optio...

Canonical Correlation and Assortative Matching: A Remark In the context of the Beckerian theory of marriage, when men and women match on a singledimensional index that is the weighted sum of their respective multivariate attributes, many papers in the literature have used linear canonical correlation, and related techniques, in order to estimate these weights. We argue that this estimation tech...

Solymosi and Raghavan (2001) characterize the stability of the core of the assignment game by means of a property of the valuation matrix. They show that the core of an assignment game is a von Neumann-Morgenstern stable set if and only if its valuation matrix has a dominant diagonal. Their proof makes use of some graphtheoretical tools, while the present proof relies on the notion of buyer-sel...

A collective choice problem essentially a bargaining problem without disagreement outcome is studied. An exteneded solution, which determines simultaneously a solution and a reference point, is characterized through a system of axioms. It is proved that the unique extended solution meeting Pareto-optimality, independence of irrelevant alternatives, symmetry, and scale invariance axioms maximize...