We explore in this paper the axiomatic approach to the problem of sharing the revenue from bundled pricing. We formalize two models for this problem on the grounds of two different informational bases. In both models, we provide axiomatic rationale for natural rules to solve the problem. We, nonetheless, obtain drastic differences under each scenario, which highlights the importance of setting ...

This paper studies the core of combined games, obtained by summing different coalitional games when bargaining over multiple independent issues. It is shown that the set of balanced transferable utility games can be partitioned into equivalence classes of component games to determine whether the core of the combined game coincides with the sum of the cores of its components. © 2009 Elsevier Inc...

This paper studies farsighted behavior of firms in an oligopolistic market to form a dominant cartel, which has a power to set and control the price in the market. The von Neumann-Morgenstern stable set is adopted as the solution concept. In contrast to the literature, we do not assume a priori the optimal pricing behavior of the cartel; rather, we show that such behavior arises from the result...

We propose an allocation rule that takes into account the importance of players and their links and characterizes it for a fixed network. Unlike previous rules, our characterization does not require component additivity. Next, we extend it to flexible networks à la Jackson (2005). Finally, we provide a comparison with other fixed (network Myerson and Position value) and flexible network (player...

A natural extension of superadditivity is not sufficient to imply that the grand coalition is efficient when externalities are present. We provide a condition, analogous to convexity, that is sufficient for the grand coalition to be efficient and show that this also implies that the (appropriately defined) core is nonempty. Moreover, we propose a mechanism which implements the most efficient pa...

Solymosi and Raghavan (2001) characterize the stability of the core of the assignment game by means of a property of the valuation matrix. They show that the core of an assignment game is a von Neumann-Morgenstern stable set if and only if its valuation matrix has a dominant diagonal. Their proof makes use of some graphtheoretical tools, while the present proof relies on the notion of buyer-sel...

A collective choice problem essentially a bargaining problem without disagreement outcome is studied. An exteneded solution, which determines simultaneously a solution and a reference point, is characterized through a system of axioms. It is proved that the unique extended solution meeting Pareto-optimality, independence of irrelevant alternatives, symmetry, and scale invariance axioms maximize...

We consider a continuum economy with infinitely many commodities and show that, for any positive =, the core of the economy coincides with the set of allocations which are not blocked by any coalition with measure less than =. Actually, our main result is an extension of Grodal's (1972, Econometrica 40, 581 583) result and, therefore, Schmeidler's (1972, Econometrica 40, 579 580) result to econ...

We give an axiomatization of the Aumann-Shapley cost-sharing method in the discrete case by means of monotonicity and no merging or splitting (Sprumont, 2005 [16]). Monotonicity has not yet been employed to characterize this method in such a case, unlike the case in which goods are perfectly divisible, for which Monderer and Neyman (1988) [10] and Young (1985) [19] characterize the Aumann-Shapl...

We use the axiomatization of the position value for network situations in van den Nouweland and Slikker (2012) to define a position value for partition function form network situations by generalizing the axioms to the partition function form value function setting as studied in Navarro (2007) and then showing that there exists a unique allocation rule satisfying these axioms. We call this allo...