We construct the contingent claims models that price participating policies with rate guarantees, bonuses and default risk. These policies are characterized by the sharing of profits from an investment portfolio between the insurer and the policy holders. A certain surplus distribution mechanism (reversionary bonus) is employed to credit interest at or above certain specified guaranteed rate pe...

This paper reports on a two-task principal-agent experiment in which only one task is contractible. The principal can either offer a piece-rate contract or a (voluntary) bonus to the agent. Bonus contracts strongly outperform piece rate contracts. Many principals reward high efforts on both tasks with substantial bonuses. Agents anticipate this and provide high efforts on both tasks. In contras...

This paper analyses the motivational dimension in the firm within different organisational set-ups characterised by their levels of hierarchical pressure and two types of bonus rules, a Gaussian and a non Gaussian distribution perceived as more risky by the employees. The model shows the importance of the rules for vertical trust building. In particular, trust increases with the perception of m...

NOVEMBER/DECEMBER 2010 CATARACT & REFRACTIVE SURGERY TODAY EUROPE 23 F ull-thickness penetrating keratoplasty (PKP) has been the preferred corneal transplantation technique since the procedure was first described in 1905 by Eduard Zirm.1 Today, PKP generally results in clear corneal grafts, with a graft survival rate of up to 72% at 5 years.2 However, the procedure is frequently complicated by ...

OCTOBER 2011 CATARACT & REFRACTIVE SURGERY TODAY EUROPE 31 A classic problem in cataract surgery is the a priori determination of the ideal power of the IOL to be implanted. After a long history of efforts by many practitioners and enthusiasts, current IOL power calculation methods provide reasonably good average accuracy. However, the price for this progress is an increasing number of formulas...

We show experimentally that fairness concerns may have a decisive impact on the actual and optimal choice of contracts in a moral hazard context. Bonus contracts that offer a voluntary and unenforceable bonus for satisfactory performance provide powerful incentives and are superior to explicit incentive contracts when there are some fair-minded players. But trust contracts that pay a generous w...

This paper reports on a two-task principal–agent experiment in which only one task is contractible. The principal can either offer a piece-rate contract or a (voluntary) bonus to the agent. Bonus contracts strongly outperform piece-rate contracts. Many principals reward high effort on both tasks with substantial bonuses. Agents anticipate this and provide high effort on both tasks. In contrast,...

Developed economies, experiencing concomitant declining fertility and rising educational attainment, have introduced policies to boost fertility. This paper extends Galor and Weil (2000) by introducing bought in services as an input in both the rearing and education of children. Within this framework, we analyse the e¤ects on fertility and education of a baby bonus, paid maternity leave and chi...

This paper reports on a two-task principal-agent experiment in which only one task is contractible. The principal can either offer a piece-rate contract or a (voluntary) bonus to the agent. Bonus contracts strongly outperform piece rate contracts. Many principals reward high efforts on both tasks with substantial bonuses. Agents anticipate this and provide high efforts on both tasks. In contras...

This paper reports on a two-task principal-agent experiment in which only one task is contractible. The principal can either offer a piece-rate contract or a (voluntary) bonus to the agent. Bonus contracts strongly outperform piece rate contracts. Many principals reward high efforts on both tasks with substantial bonuses. Agents anticipate this and provide high efforts on both tasks. In contras...