several seminar audiences for many important comments. Of course, the usual disclaimer applies. Abstract A contract with K-class pricing divides a large set of goods or services into K classes and assigns a single price to any element of a class. While the literature has emphasized rationales based on screening, we here look at the implications of costly pricing. Our analysis suggests that clas...

Available online 5 June 2013

A novel and efficient method is presented for grouping feature points on the basis of their underlying symmetry and characterising the symmetries present in an image. We show how symmetric pairs of features can be efficiently detected, how the symmetry bonding each pair is extracted and evaluated, and how these can be grouped into symmetric constellations that specify the dominant symmetries pr...

This paper considers the effects of joint negotiation when suppliers and intermediaries engage in bilateral negotiation over inclusion of a supplier’s product in an intermediary’s network. I identify conditions under which joint negotiation by two suppliers increases the suppliers’ bargaining power even when the suppliers’ products are not substitutes for each other. In particular, joint negoti...

We describe the strategy of our negotiating agent, Nice Tit for Tat Agent, which reached the finals of the 2011 Automated Negotiating Agent Competition. It uses a Tit for Tat strategy to select its offers in a negotiation, i.e.: initially it cooperates with its opponent, and in the following rounds of negotiation, it responds in kind to the opponent’s actions. We give an overview of how to impl...

This paper evaluates whether the exchange rate of Bangladesh is mean reverting or not by applying first-generation and second-generation panel unit root test approaches. The paper considers annual data from 1986 to 2011 of major twenty-two trading partners of Bangladesh. Although some inconclusive outcomes emerge from the first-generation tests, the second-generation test reconciles the controv...

The paper studies bilateral contracting between N agents and one principal, whose trade with each agent generates externalities on other agents. It examines the effects of prohibiting the principal from (i) coordinating agents on her preferred equilibrium, and (ii) making different contracts available to different agents. These effects depend on whether an agent is more or less eager to trade w...