______________________ Abstract: Bi-level programming, a tool for modeling decentralized decisions, consists of the objective(s) of the leader at its first level and that is of the follower at the second level. Three level programming results when second level is itself a bi-level programming. By extending this idea it is possible to define multi-level programs with any number of levels. Supply...

This paper presents a competitive supply chain network design problem in which one, two, or three supply chains are planning to enter the price-dependent markets simultaneously in uncertain environments and decide to set the prices and shape their networks. The chains produce competitive products either identical or highly substitutable. Fuzzy multi-level mixed integer programming is used to mo...

In this paper, a bi-level game-theoretic model is proposed to investigate the effects of governmental financial intervention on green supply chain. This problem is formulated as a bi-level program for a green supply chain that produces various products with different environmental pollution levels. The problem is also regard uncertainties in market demand and sale price of raw materials and pro...

Bi-level decision addresses compromises between two interacting decision entities within a given hierarchical complex systems. Bi-level programming typically solves bi-level decision problems. However, formulation of objectives and constraints in mathematical functions is required, which are difficult, and sometimes impossible, in real-world situations due to various uncertainties. Our study de...

This paper proposes a kind of bi-level linear programming problem, in which there are two decision makers in a hierarchy and they have a common variable. To deal with this bi-level problem, we introduce a virtual decision maker, who controls the common variable to maximize the sum of the objective functions of the upper and lower level decision maker (the leader and follower). To illustrate the...

This study considers pricing, production and transportation decisions in a Stackelberg game between three-stage, multi-product, multi-source and single-period supply chains called leader and follower. These chains consist of; manufacturers, distribution centers (DCs) and retailers. Competition type is horizontal and SC vs. SC. The retailers in two chains try to maximize their profit through pri...

The Generalised Nash Equilibrium Problem (GNEP) is a Nash game with the distinct feature that the feasible strategy set of a player depends on the strategies chosen by all her opponents in the game. This characteristic distinguishes the GNEP from a conventional Nash Game. These shared constraints on each player’s decision space, being dependent on decisions of others in the game, increases its ...