Studies on information sharing in oligopolies focus either Cournot or Bertrand markets. We consider a Cournot–Bertrand market where owners provide strategic managerial incentives and can share the details of their compensation contracts. find that firm punishes its manager for sales, whereas rewards sales. Both firms contract if firms' products are sufficiently differentiated. However, product ...

Nos adentraremos en la obra inspirada poemas de Aloysius Bertrand, compuesta por Maurice Ravel.

We show that there is a unique correlated equilibrium, identical to the unique Nash equilibrium, in the classic Bertrand oligopoly model with homogenous goods and identical marginal costs. This provides a theoretical underpinning for the socalled “Bertrand paradox” as well as its most general formulation to date. Our proof generalizes to asymmetric marginal costs and arbitrarily many players in...

We compare the number of active firms, i.e. the number of firms producing a positive quantity, in equilibrium across four different models of oligopoly: Cournot and Bertrand with homogeneous or differentiated goods. We concentrate on the linear demand structure with constant marginal but asymmetric costs. (With symmetric costs, the results trivialize to all firms active or all firms inactive.) ...

<p style='text-indent:20px;'>This paper investigates a manufacturer's retail outsourcing strategies under different competition modes with economies of scale. We focus on the effects market modes, scale and competitor's behavior decisions, then we develop four game models three modes. Firstly, find channel structure where both manufacturers choose cannot be an equilibrium Cournot competit...