a method for solving the descriptor discrete-time linear system is focused. for easily, it is converted to a standard discrete-time linear system by the definition of a derivative state feedback. then partial eigenvalue assignment is used for obtaining state feedback and solving the standard system. in partial eigenvalue assignment, just a part of the open loop spectrum of the standard linear s...

This note is a response to an unpublished paper by Evans and Thomas (1998) of which we have recently become aware. Evans and Thomas (1998) take issue with a paper that we published some years back on ‘Cooperation and Effective Computability’ in repeated games (Anderlini and Sabourian 1995). In that paper we showed that it is only the cooperative equilibria of an infinitely repeated two-player c...

Endogeneous Household Interaction Most econometric models of intrahousehold behavior assume that household decisionmaking is efficient, i.e., utility realizations lie on the Pareto frontier. In this paper we investigate this claim by adding a number of participation constraints to the household allocation problem. Short-run constraints ensure that each spouse obtains a utility level at least eq...

We consider a finite two-player zero-sum game with vector-valued rewards. We study the question of whether a given polyhedral set D is “approachable,” that is, whether Player 1 (the “decision maker”) can guarantee that the long-term average reward belongs to D, for any strategy of Player 2 (the “adversary”). We examine Blackwell’s necessary and sufficient conditions for approachability, and sho...

Consider agents who undertake costly effort to produce stochastic outputs observable by a principal. The principal can award a prize to them with probabilities that depend on their outputs. His goal is to elicit maximal effort from the agents for the least prize. We show that, given a general class Π of probabilistic schemes for awarding the prize and a domain of agents’characteristics on which...

Consider agents who undertake costly effort to produce stochastic outputs observable by a principal. The principal can award a prize deterministically to the agent with the highest output or to all of them with probabilities that are proportional to their outputs. We show that the deterministic prize elicits more (expected, total) output when agents’ abilities are evenly matched, otherwise the ...

One-sided assignment problems combine important features of two well-known matching models. First, as in roommate problems, any two agents can be matched and second, as in two-sided assignment problems, the payoffs of a matching can be divided between the agents. We take a similar approach to one-sided assignment problems as Sasaki (1995) for two-sided assignment problems and we analyze various...

We define two families of rules to adjudicate conflicting claims. The first family contains the constrained equal awards, constrained equal losses, Talmud, and minimal overlap rules. The second family, which also contains the constrained equal awards and constrained equal losses rules, is obtained from the first one by exchanging, for each problem, how well agents with relatively larger claims ...

This paper examines an equilibrium model of social memory — a society’s vicarious beliefs about its past. We show that incorrect social memory is a key ingredient in creating and perpetuating destructive conflicts. We analyze an infinite-horizon model in which two countries face off each period in a game of conflict characterized by the possibility of mutually destructive “all out war” that yie...

Examples of repeated destructive behavior abound throughout the history of human societies. This paper examines the role of social memory — a society’s vicarious beliefs about the past — in creating and perpetuating destructive conflicts. We examine whether such behavior is consistent with the theory of rational strategic behavior. We analyze an infinite-horizon model in which two countries fac...