Management matters for firms, but what practices are optimal in hierarchical government organizations? And can skilled managers identify them? A large-scale randomized trial conducted with the police of Rajasthan, India, tested four interventions recommended by senior officers: limitations transfers, rotation duties and days off, increased community involvement, on-duty training. Field experien...

Can information and communication technologies help citizens monitor their elections? We analyze a large-scale field experiment designed to answer this question in Colombia. leveraged Facebook advertisements sent over 4 million potential voters encourage citizen reporting of electoral irregularities. also cross-randomized whether candidates were informed about the campaign subset municipalities...

Are ordinary citizens or political party leaders better positioned to select candidates? While the American primary system lets choose, most democracies rely instead on officials appoint nominate candidates. The consequences of these distinct design choices are unclear: while often informed about candidate qualifications, they may value traits, like loyalty willingness pay for nomination, at od...

We use a policy experiment in Indonesia to show how local political boundaries affect ethnic tension. Redrawing district borders along group lines reduces conflict. However, the gains stability are undone or even reversed when new increase polarization. Greater polarization leads more violence around majoritarian elections but has little effect lower-stakes, proportional representation election...

Program Quality and Treatment Completion for Youth Training Programs This paper analyzes the effects of training quality on the likelihood of treatment completion by estimating dose-response functions via a generalized propensity score. Results show a statistically positive relationship between training quality and treatment completion for youth participants in Peru. JEL Classification: I3, J2, C8

This paper investigates the trade-offs between local elites and state agents as tax collectors in low-capacity states. We study a randomized policy experiment assigning neighborhoods of large Congolese city to property collection by chiefs or agents. Chief raised compliance 3.2 percentage points, increasing revenue 44 percent. Chiefs collected more bribes but did not undermine morale trust gove...

This article aims to analyse the plight of migrant workers in India during Covid 19 pandemic from a political economy perspective. While taking note disruptions and uncertainties drastic lockdown that was announced suddenly, it is argued vulnerabilities labour force are deeply embedded long-term changes development India. These changes, on one hand, have resulted gradual weakening state support...

This paper argues that self-reporting schemes whereby citizens report their noncompliance with regulation can prevent corruption in administrations. In our model, entrepreneurs must comply with regulation before undertaking a risky activity. O cials verify compliance before granting permits, and may engage in either bribery or extortion. Without a self-reporting scheme, the government tolerates...

This paper analyzes how preferences for a noneconomic characteristic (e.g., caste) can affect equilibrium patterns of matching, and empirically evaluates this in the context of middle-class Indian arranged marriages. We show theoretically how the equilibrium consequences of caste depend on whether preferences are towards one’s own group or for “marrying up.” We then estimate actual preferences ...