Self-signaling models predict less selfish behavior in a probabilistic giving setting as individuals are expected to invest pro-social identity. However, there is also substantial evidence that people tend exploit situational excuses for choices (for instance, uncertainty) and behave more selfishly. We contrast these two motivations (identity management self-deception) experimentally order test...

We introduce best response dynamics for settings where agents' preferences are diverse. Under these dynamics, which are defined on the space of Bayesian strategies, rest points and Bayesian Nash equilibria are identical. We prove the existence and uniqueness of solution trajectories to these dynamics, and provide methods of analyzing the dynamics based on aggregation. JEL Classification: C72, C73

We show that if the set of subgame perfect equilibrium payoffs of a stage game is convexified by the introduction of public random variables, then forward induction loses all its power as an argument for refining Nash equilibrium. We establish that our argument does not depend on a convenient choice of off-equilibrium path beliefs. JEL Classification C72

This paper extends the connections model of network formation by allowing for players who are heterogeneous with respect to values as well as the costs of forming links. Our principal result is that centrality and short average distances between individuals are robust features of equilibrium networks.  2005 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved. JEL classification: C72

We show that in a duopoly operating in a congested market, with a general congestion function and an arbitrary distribution of consumer disutility for congestion, there cannot exist an asymmetric Nash equilibrium. We also show that whenever an equilibrium does exist it is unique. Closed form expressions for the symmetric equilibrium prices and profits are provided. JEL Classification Numbers: C...

We construct both monotonic and non-monotonic symmetric Bayesian Nash equilibria for a two-player all-pay contest with binary types and correlated information structures. We also employ a class of parametric distributions to illustrate our equilibrium construction explicitly and to derive some comparative statics results. JEL classi…cations: C72, D44, D72, D82.

In an experimental 2x2 coordination game with two strict equilibria we observe that, in contrast to equilibrium selection theory (Harsanyi and Selten 1988), only half of the subjects choose the strategy that relates to the payoffand risk-dominant equilibrium. We propose modified risk dominance as an explanation for the observed deviations from payoff and risk dominance. JEL classification: C72,...

The satisficing approach is generalized and applied to finite n-person games. Based on direct elicitation of aspirations, we formally define the concept of satisficing, which does not exclude (prior-free) optimality but includes it as a border case. We also review some experiments on strategic games illustrating and partly supporting our theoretical approach. JEL classification: C72; C92; D01

We propose an allocation rule that takes into account the importance of players and their links. Since a network describes the interaction structure between agents, our allocation rule covers both bilateral and multilateral interactions. We provide a characterization of this rule in terms of well known axioms and compare it to other allocation rules in the literature. JEL classifications: A14; ...

In a convincing analysis of the conditions and strength of altruism, Bester and Güth [Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Vol. 34, 1998, 193-209] unfortunately restrict the interpretation of their results. Their paper provides us with an analysis of the conditions and strength of malevolence (or envy) as well. ©2000 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved. JEL classification: A13; C7...