Salma Karray gratefully acknowledges the Natural Sciences and Engineering Research Council of Canada (NSERC) for their financial support (RGPIN-2020-05156). Guiomar Martin-Herran from Spanish MINECO (AEI) under project ECO2017-82227-P Junta de Castilla y Leon projects VA105G18 VA169P20 co-financed by FEDER funds (EU). Simon Pierre Sigue Athabasca University an ARF grant.

Television advertising of prescription drugs is controversial, and it remains illegal in all but two countries. Much of the opposition stems from concerns that advertising directly to consumers may inefficiently distort prescribing patterns toward the advertised product. Despite the controversy surrounding the practice, its effects are not well understood. Exploiting a discontinuity in advertis...

© 2007 The Authors Journal compilation © 2007 Australian Agricultural and Resource Economics Society Inc. and Blackwell Publishing Ltd doi: 10.1111/j.1467-8489.2007.00385.x Blackwell Publishing Ltd Oxford, UK AJAR ustralian Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics 1364-985X © 2007 The Author Journ Compilat on © 2007 A str lian Agricultural and Resource Economics Society Inc. and Blackwell...

We illustrate a differential oligopoly game where firms compete à la Cournot in homogeneous goods in the market phase, and invest in advertising activities aimed at increasing consumers’ reservation price. Such investments produce external effects, characterizing the advertising activity as a public good. We derive the open-loop and the closed-loop Nash equilibria, and show that the properties ...

“Beef. It’s What’s for Dinner.” “Got Milk?” “Pork. The Other White Meat.” “Flowers. Alive with Possibilities.” We have all heard and seen these and similar promotional messages over the years on television, over the radio, and in magazines. Often labeled generic advertising, these messages are government-sanctioned but producer-funded efforts to enhance the demand for farm commodities. As oppos...

This paper analyzes the effects of cooperative R&D in two vertically related duopolies, which are two final-good manufacturers and two input suppliers, with horizontal and vertical spillovers. Vertical R&D cartels yield a larger social welfare than non-cooperative R&D and, if the horizontal spillover rate between the input suppliers is not sufficiently high, than horizontal R&D cartels. Technol...