There are many ways an election can go wrong or be suspect. Perhaps ballots were lost—and known to be lost. Perhaps a memory card failed—and was known to have failed. Perhaps more votes were reported than there were voters. Perhaps the announced outcome is correct but the evidence supporting it is incomplete or unconvincing. Perhaps some people claim to have observed irregularities. An election...

We explore the notion of “verifiability” by analyzing a simple model of evidence production in contractual relationships with complete information. We characterize implementability in terms of the existence and form of “hard evidence.” We provide results on maximal and minimal evidence production that are, respectively, necessary and sufficient for implementation. We briefly discuss the relevan...

All voter-verifiable voting schemes in the literature require that the voter be able to see and to mark. This paper describes modifications to the Prêt à Voter and PunchScan schemes so that a voter who can either see or hear, or both, independent of marking ability, may avail of voter-verifiability without revealing her vote. The modified systems would provide privacy and integrity guarantees t...

The desired security properties of electronic voting protocols include verifiability, accuracy, democracy and fairness. In this paper we use a static program analysis tool to validate these properties for one of the classical voting protocols under appropriate assumptions. The protocol is formalised in an extension of the LYSA process calculus with blinding signatures. The analysis, which is fu...

The Helios voting scheme is well studied including formal proofs for verifiability and ballot privacy, but it does not provide participation privacy (i.e. it reveals who participated in the election). Kulyk, Teague and Volkamer proposed an extension to Helios that is claimed to provide ballot privacy as well as participation privacy while providing stronger verifiability than Helios. However, t...

Most electronic voting schemes aim at providing verifiability: voters should trust the result without having to rely on some authorities. Actually, even a prominent voting system like Helios cannot fully achieve verifiability since a dishonest bulletin board may add ballots. This problem is called ballot stuffing. In this paper we give a definition of verifiability in the computational model to...

When reporting the news, journalists rely on the statements of stakeholders, experts, and officials. The attribution of such a statement is verifiable if its fidelity to the source can be confirmed or denied. In this paper, we develop a new NLP task: determining the verifiability of an attribution based on linguistic cues. We operationalize the notion of verifiability as a score between 0 and 1...

The use of e-Auction services has been increasing in recent years. Security requirements in conducting eAuctions are mainly bid privacy, anonymity and public verifiability. Most of the secure protocols concentrate on privacy and anonymity, which are achieved through bidder-resolved multi-party computation, assuming two or more trusted third parties, either through numerous auctioneers or with a...

This paper presents an information-theoretic model of a voting system, consisting of (a) definitions of the desirable qualities of integrity, privacy and verifiability, and (b) quantitative measures of how close a system is to being perfect with respect to each of the qualities. It describes the well-known trade-off between integrity and privacy in this model, and defines a concept of weak priv...

Electronic democracy (e-democracy) is a necessity in this era of computers and information technology. Electronic election (e-election) is one of the most important applications of e-democracy, because of the importance of the voters’ privacy and the possibility of frauds. Electronic voting (e-voting) is the most significant part of e-election, which refers to the use of computers or computeris...