How can firms profitably give away free products? This paper provides a novel answer and articulates tradeoffs in a space of information product design. We introduce a formal model of two-sided network externalities based in textbook economics—a mix of Katz & Shapiro network effects, price discrimination, and product differentiation. Externality-based complements, however, exploit a different m...

This paper studies long-run sustainability of false reputations in a class of games with imperfect public monitoring and two long-lived players, both of whom have private information about their own type and uncertainty over the types of the other player. This class, namely reputation games with one-sided moral hazard, can capture a wide range of economic interactions between two parties that m...

Abstract When reporting tests of significance, researchers might claim to have conducted a two-sided test when in fact they two one-sided tests. Mark Rubin explains the confusion and how avoid it.

Communication, even cheap talk in a pre-play stage, is commonly viewed as important for inducing information revelation, coordination, and efficient outcomes. Yet, many current results are based on two assumptions that seem to be inconsistent with many interesting empirical situations: that only one player is privately informed and that actors have no constraints limiting their actions. We reme...

This paper studies reputation effects in a class of games with imperfect public monitoring and two long-lived players, both of whom have private information about their own type and uncertainty over the types of the other player. Players may be either a strategic type who maximizes expected utility or a (simple) commitment type who plays a prespecified action every period. As in standard models...

Commerce in information goods is one of the earliest emerging applications for intelligent agents in commerce. However, the fundamental characteristics of information goods mean that they can and likely will be o ered in widely varying con gurations. Participating agents will need to deal with uncertainty about both prices and location in multi-dimensional product space. Thus, studying the beha...

We have developed a new two-sided matching protocol including job applicants and employers in the condition that applicants have conditional preferences and well informed applicants exist. In past research, two-sided matching has covered some assignment problems such as residency matching. However, in the case of matching on the information network, different applicants are differently informed...