Heterogeneity in Nash networks can arise due to differences in the following four variables: (i) the value of information held by agents, (ii) the rate at which information decays or loses its value as it traverses the network, (iii) the probability with which a links transmits information, and (iv) the cost of forming a link. In this paper we examine Nash networks, efficient networks and the e...

The paper gives an introduction to the physics approach social systems providing main definitions and notions used in modeling of these systems. behavior is illustrated by several quite simple, typical models. present part considers equilibrium Nonequilibrium will be presented second review. style combines features a tutorial survey, which, from one side, makes it simpler read for nonspecialist...

We generalize the notion of Ichiishi (Econometrica 49(2):369–377, 1981)’s social coalitional equilibrium to a multi-layered coalition structure with parameters, in which agents can incorporate simultaneously multiple structures independent coalition-deviation opportunities. For each opportunity, play (SCE) game, called sub-parametric SCE constrained by external environment (parameters and joint...

This article shows that social norms are better explained as correlating devices for a correlated equilibrium of the underlying stage game, rather than Nash equilibria. Whereas the epistemological requirements for rational agents playing Nash equilibria are very stringent and usually implausible, the requirements for a correlated equilibrium amount to the existence of common priors, which we in...

We examine a new class of games, which we call social games, where players not only choose strategies but also choose with whom they play. A group of players who are dissatis ed with the play of their current partners can join together and play a new equilibrium. This imposes new re nements on equilibrium play, where play depends on the relative populations of players in di erent roles, among o...

This paper introduces systems of exchange values as tools for the self-regulation of multi-agent systems. Systems of exchange values are defined on the basis of the sociological model of social exchanges proposed by J. Piaget. A model of social control is proposed, where exchange values are used for supporting the regulation of the performance of social exchanges. Social control is structured a...

A social choice function: A function that determines a social choice according to players’ preferences over the different possible alternatives. A mechanism: a game in incomplete information, in which player strategies are based on their private preferences. A mechanism implements a social choice function f if the equilibrium strategies yield an outcome that coincides with f . Dominant strategi...

Implementation theory tackles the following problem: given a social choice correspondence, find a decentralized mechanism such that for every constellation of the individuals’ preferences, the set of outcomes in equilibrium is exactly the set of socially optimal alternatives (as specified by the correspondence). In this paper we are concerned with implementation by mediated equilibrium; under s...