Majority auction games are simultaneous sealed-bid auctions of identical objects among identical bidders who each want to win a specified fraction (more than a half) of the objects. Each bidder receives no benefit from winning less than the specified fraction and no additional benefit from winning more than it. Symmetric equilibria having simple, intuitive forms are shown to exist in firstprice...

This paper and its companion piece, Dutta-Siconolfi (2016a) prove a First Welfare Theorem for Games. It is shown that finite horizon asynchronous games with voluntary one period ahead transfers have a unique equilibrium that coincides with the Utilitarian Pareto Optimum. Whilst it is commonly thought that Folk Theorems are endemic in dynamic games, the result relies critically on two assumption...

Symmetric equilibria are constructed for a class of symmetric auction games. The games all have two identical bidders bidding in two simultaneous sealed-bid auctions for identical objects. Information is complete and the objects are either complements or substitutes. In both cases a continuum of mixed-strategy equilibria are identified. All these equilibria have a surprising structure: The supp...

This paper addresses the issue of endogenizing the equilibrium solution when a private –domestic or foreign –…rm competes in the quantities with a public, welfare maximizing …rm. Theoretical literature on mixed oligopolies provides results and policy implications that crucially rely on the notion of equilibrium assumed, either sequential or simultaneous. In the framework of the endogenous timin...

We study Monte Carlo tree search (MCTS) in zero-sum extensive-form games with perfect information and simultaneous moves. We present a general template of MCTS algorithms for these games, which can be instantiated by various selection methods. We formally prove that if a selection method is -Hannan consistent in a matrix game and satisfies additional requirements on exploration, then the MCTS a...

This paper studies the learning process carried out by two agents who are involved in many games. As distinguishing all games can be too costly (require too much reasoning resources) agents might partition the set of all games into analogy classes. Partitions of higher cardinality are more costly. A process of simultaneous learning of actions and partitions is presented and equilibrium partitio...

A basic model of commitment is to convert a two-player game in strategic form to a “leadership game” with the same payoffs, where one player, the leader, commits to a strategy, to which the second player always chooses a best reply. This paper studies such leadership games for games with convex strategy sets. We apply them to mixed extensions of finite games, which we analyze completely, includ...

We present an endogenous-timing conflict game of incomplete information under strategic complementarity. The model predicts multiple equilibria, in which the outcome follows either a simultaneous move (Baliga and Sjöström, 2004) or sequential game, improves social welfare. study three families games laboratory using gender-balanced sessions. Our results suggest that: (i) welfare is higher compa...

Strategic games: simultaneous choices of 2 or more players • 2 firms: P1 sets q1 and maximizes payoff π1(q1, q2), P2 sets q2 and maximizes payoff π2(q1, q2). Want simultaneous optimal choices given the other player’s choice. • Chapters 2: Finite number of choices for each player • Chapters 3: Continuous choice of quantity for each player • Chapter 4: Play choices probabilistically, mixed strate...

background: the rapid growth of computer games, has taken a major part of teenagers leisure time. the improper and overuse of these games, can be considered as physical, mental and social threats. the goal of this study was to determine the relationship between playing computer games and students’ aggression and academic progress.   methods: in this cross- sectional study, 292 students in grade...