We study a general aggregation problem in which a society has to determine its position on each of several issues, based on the positions of the members of the society on those issues. There is a prescribed set of feasible evaluations, i.e., permissible combinations of positions on the issues. Among other things, this framework admits the modeling of preference aggregation, judgment aggregation...

This paper is devoted to sequential decision making with Rank Dependent expected Utility (RDU). criterion generalizes Expected and enables model a wider range of observed (rational) behaviors. In such setting, two conflicting objectives can be identified in the assessment strategy: maximizing performance viewed from initial state (optimality), minimizing incentive deviate during implementation ...

We analyze an equilibrium concept called revision-proofness for infinite-horizon games played by a dynasty of players. Revision-proofness requires strategies to be robust to joint deviations by multiple players and is a refinement of sub-game perfection. Sub-game perfect paths that can only be sustained by reversion to paths with payoffs below those of an alternative path are not revision-proof...

ing and Verifying Strategy-proofness for Auction Mechanisms . . . 141 Emmanuel M. Tadjouddine, Frank Guerin, Wamberto Vasconcelos

We show that Maskin monotone social choice correspondences on sufficiently rich domains satisfy a generalized strategy-proofness property, thus generalizing Muller and Satterthwaite's (1977) theorem to correspondences. From the point of view of Nash implementation theory, the result yields a partial characterization of the restrictions entailed by Nash implementability. Alternatively, the resul...

There are many situations where the indifference classes of the agents’ preferences are exogenously given. We present a framework for dealing with such situations and find that the cardinality of the set S, which consists of alternatives that every agent ranks strictly, is critical to the construction of a strategyproof social choice function; if |S| ≥ 3, then strategy-proofness implies dictato...

We consider the problem of dividing a non-homogeneous onedimensional continuum whose endpoints are identified. Examples are the division of a birthday cake, the partition of a circular market, the assignment of sentry duty or medical call. We study the existence of rules satisfying various requirements of fairness (no-envy, egalitarianequivalence; and several requirements having to do with chan...

We study dominant strategy implementation especially in economic environments. Wefirst show that in general environments, strategy-proofness and quasi-strong-non-bossiness together are necessary and sufficient for dominant strategy implementation via the associated direct revelationmechanism. Wenext prove that in weak separable environments, strategy-proofness is sufficient for dominant strateg...