Akrasia has been traditionally defined as a failure to do what one has most reasons to do, or what one judges that one ought to do (McIntyre 2006; Wedgwood 2007). Traditional conceptions on akrasia take it as a violation of a commitment of the agent: “[for traditional conceptions] an agent who decisively judges it best to A is thereby rationally committed to A-ing, in the sense that (as long as...

The Belief-Desire-Intention (BDI) model of rational agency provides an abstract architecture for practical reasoning systems and is today regarded as one of the key contributions of multiagent systems research to AI. So far, however, a similar model for practical social reasoning systems that is generic enough to be used as a unifying framework for the diverse methods used to manage the interac...

An architecture for a rational agent must allow for means-end reasoning, for the weighing of competing alternatives, and for interactions between these two forms of reasoning. Such an architecture must also address the problem of resource boundedness. We sketch a solution of the rst problem that points the way to a solution of the second. In particular, we present a high-level speci cation of t...

This paper seeks a better understanding of the elements of practical reasoning: premises and conclusion. It argues that the premises of practical reasoning do not normally include statements such as ‘I want to φ’; that the reasoning in practical reasoning is the same as it is in theoretical reasoning and that what makes it practical is, first, that the point of the relevant reasoning is given b...

In a speech community, people utilize their communicative competence which they have acquired from their society as part of their distinctive sociolinguistic identity. They negotiate and share meanings, because they have commonsense knowledge about the world, and have universal practical reasoning. Their commonsense knowledge is embodied in their language. Thus, not only does social life depend...