We formulate a noncooperative game to model competition for policyholders among non-life insurance companies, taking into account market premium, solvency level, market share and underwriting results. We study Nash equilibria and Stackelberg equilibria for the premium levels, and give numerical illustrations.

In this paper, we regard policyholders, insurance companies, and government departments to be an anti-fraud supervision system, explore the of motor vehicle fraud from perspective a tripartite game. Taking into consideration bad reputation records policyholders as state variable, through continuous accumulation in effective time, it creates growth-type warning effect on thus, effectively curbs ...

The claim settlement process is one of the most critical aspects health insurance. Many policyholder grievances often surface during settlement, which will likely shape insurer’s reputation. Hence, this study aims to evaluate relationships between hypothesized factors concerning third-party administrator’s as perceived by policyholders. paper used data policyholders from Delhi/NCR, India, who h...

BACKGROUND Health examinations are performed so that diseases can be identified and treated earlier. Several studies have evaluated the determinants of participation in health examinations including cancer screening, but few have evaluated the relationship between the size of the enterprise and their participation in Workers' General Health Examinations (WGHE). The aim of the present study was ...

We develop a novel machine learning (ML) framework to estimate surrender charge for variable annuities (VAs) with the balance between human behavior and rational optimality. Optimality accounts insurers' potential losses from strategic surrenders by policyholders who attempt take advantage of market situation. However, sometimes need VA because sudden personal financial distress or terminal ill...

In the underwriting and pricing of nonlife insurance products, it is essential for insurer to utilize both policyholder information claim history ensure profitability proper risk management. this paper, we apply a flexible regression model with random effects, called Mixed Logit-weighted Reduced Mixture-of-Experts, which leverages their history, categorize policyholders into groups similar prof...

We analyze the optimal coverage level for an unreliable insurance contract if a utility-maximizing policyholder can transfer intrinsic nonperformance risk to several co-insurers. Our discussion starts with demand model under default and introduction of multiple risk-sharing instrument called co-insurance policy. Subsequently, we examine interrelation between recovery rate level, utility policyh...