A policy maker faces a sequence of unknown outcomes. At each stage two (self-proclaimed) experts provide probabilistic forecasts on the outcome in the next stage. A comparison test is a protocol for the policy maker to (eventually) decide which of the two experts is better informed. The protocol takes as input the sequence of pairs of forecasts and actual realizations and (weakly) ranks the two...

This paper analyzes whether the behavior of potential offenders can be guided by information on the actual detection probability transmitted by the policy maker. It is established that, when viewed as a cheap-talk game, the existence of equilibria with information transmission depends on the level of the sanction, the level of costs related to imposing the sanction, and the level of social harm...

This paper addresses the problem of fair equilibrium selection in graphical games. Our approach is based on the data structure called the best response policy, which was proposed by Kearns et al. [12] as a way to represent all Nash equilibria of a graphical game. In [9], it was shown that the best response policy has polynomial size as long as the underlying graph is a path. In this paper, we s...

In the model presented here, n parties choose policy positions in a space Z of dimension at least two. Each party is represented by a ‘‘principal’’ whose true policy preferences on Z are unknown to other principals. In the first version of the model the party declarations determine the lottery outcome of coalition negotiation. The coalition risk functions are common knowledge to the parties. We...

In enforcing policy measures under incomplete information neither an individual nor a collective penalty may generate sufficient incentive compatibility. Individual monitoring may be avoided, while collective penalties may lead to multiple Nash-equilibria. In this paper it is shown that by combining elements of both kind of penalties these problems are solved: circumventing monitoring devices d...

We address the problem of how to play optimally against a fixed opponent in a twoplayer card game with partial information like poker. A game theoretic approach to this problem would specify a pair of stochastic policies that are best-responses to each other, i.e., a Nash equilibrium. Although such a Nash-optimal policy guarantees a lower bound to the attainable payoff against any opponent, it ...

The present paper is an attempt to develop a new heuristic algorithm, find the optimal sequence to minimize the utilization time of the machines and hence their rental cost for two stage specially structured flow shop scheduling under specified rental policy in which processing times and set up time are associated with their respective probabilities including transportation time. Further jo...

Abstract We call a decision maker risk averse for losses if that is with respect to lotteries having alternatives below given reference alternative in their support. A two-person bargaining solution called invariant under aversion the assigned outcome does not change after correcting this as pair of levels, provided disagreement point only changes proportionally. present an axiomatic characteri...

The performance of an enterprise depends on the capabilities of the agents that control it and on how these agents are organized. The division and coordination of labor are two of the principal functions of an organization. This paper assembles a five-dimensional space from which organization designers can select coordination policies for a wide class of distributed enterprises. The assembly is...