Ground Representationism is the position that for each phenomenal feature there is a representational feature that accounts for it. Against this thesis, Ned Block has provided an intricate argument that rests on the notion of “phenomenal precision”: the phenomenal precision of a percept may change at a different rate from its representational counterpart. If so, there is then no representationa...

Representationalists argue that phenomenal states are intentional states of a special kind. This paper offers an account of the kind of intentional state phenomenal states are: they are underived intentional states. This account of phenomenal states is equivalent to two theses: first, all possible phenomenal states are underived intentional states; second, all possible underived intentional sta...

Phenomenal consciousness is the property mental states, events, and processes have when, and only when, there is something it is like for their subject to undergo them, or be in them. What it is like to have a conscious experience is customarily referred to as the experience’s phenomenal character. Theories of consciousness attempt to account for this phenomenal character. This article surveys ...

European Journal of PhilosophyEarly View BOOK SYMPOSIUM Brentano on phenomenal and transitive consciousness, unconscious intentionality Angela Mendelovici, Corresponding Author Mendelovici [email protected] orcid.org/0000-0002-5496-0141 Department Philosophy, Western University, London, Canada Correspondence Ontario, Canada. Email: [email protected] for more papers by this author First publis...